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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to add to the understanding of democratic
consolidation, and to address a debate within this topic: Is presidentialism harmful
to democratic consolidation? I argue that presidentialism induces higher levels of
political violence (attitudinally and behaviorally). Unlike parliamentary and semi-
presidential systems, which offer mechanisms to alter the incumbent government
through legislative responsibility, such as a vote of no confidence or a government
reshuﬄe, when there exist mismatched policy expectations between the public and
the government, or when the public dissatisfaction with the government is high, pres-
idential systems do not have this mechanism to change the government composition
and the president is empowered to govern until the next election. Even in the case
that the public’s discontent toward the president is high, there exist almost no mech-
anisms except for her own resignation and an impeachment to remove her from her
office. However, a voluntary resignation and an impeachment are rarely occurred in
the history, and thus, the expectation of the public regarding whether their grievances
can be resolved and addressed is more difficult to be fulfilled in presidential democ-
racies. Therefore, using and considering violence as a mean to address their political
and social problems becomes a more viable option in presidential democracies. But
by doing so, political stability will decrease and democratic consolidation will be
hindered. I employ the World Value Survey and the Asian Barometer Survey to find
support for this argument.
To further extend this argument and to address the debate, I argue that demo-
cratic breakdown must be considered a two-step process. For a democracy to break
down, the presence of a democratic crisis that presents a significant likelihood of
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overthrowing the current democratic regime is necessary. Specifically, I argue that
presidentialism generates political instability through its institutions, which are asso-
ciated with a greater likelihood of the emergence of a democratic crisis, but political
instability does not further contribute from democratic crisis to democratic break-
down. Using data covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008, I demonstrate
that presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than either parlia-
mentary or semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism
does not lead to a higher likelihood of breakdown. Thus, presidentialism is associated
with a higher likelihood of democratic breakdown, but only by affecting half of the
process.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
According to Schedler, democratic consolidation is “meant to describe the chal-
lenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond
the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regres-
sion, of building dams against eventual “reverse waves”” (1998: 91). This topic has
long been an important subfield in comparative politics. Scholars are particularly in-
terested in the conditions that sustain existing or new democracies. These conditions
can be economical, institutional, cultural, or behavioral and attitudinal. For exam-
ple, the modernization theory posits that economic development is the key factor
explaining democratic transition and consolidation (e.g., Lipset 1959). In addition,
scholars also argue that Islamism is not compatible with democracy and thus hinders
the process of democratization (e.g., Fish 2002).
This dissertation combines two different approaches, behavior (attitude) and in-
stitution, and demonstrates that this combination is able to contribute greatly to
the study of democratic consolidation. In particular, I investigate the relationship
between political violence, political institution (presidentialism), and democratic con-
solidation. I first study the relationship between political institution (presidential-
ism) and violent attitude. Second, I research whether political institution (presiden-
tialism) also explains violent behavior. Lastly, I investigate how political institution
(presidentialism) affects domestic political violence (democratic crisis) and demo-
cratic breakdown, and intend to resolve a long-existing academic puzzle regarding
whether presidentialism is associated with democratic breakdown.
I have developed an active research interest in the field of democratic consolida-
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tion. The motivation behind this dissertation is an early inspiration by Juan Linz
(1990a), who argues that presidential systems are harmful for democratic survival.
However, decades of findings are contradictory and inconclusive. This dissertation
intends to offer a tentative conclusion to this debate. To do so, I argues that, due
to the rigidity of changing the government in presidential democracies, individuals
and groups who are dissatisfied with their government, political system, and society
are more likely to believe that using violence is justifiable. This argument is evi-
dent by the World Value Survey. To further extend this finding, I also argue that,
again, due to the rigidity of changing the government in presidential democracies,
individuals and groups who hold strong dissatisfactions with their government, po-
litical system, and society are more likely to use extreme violent strategies (hard
protest behaviors, such as violent protests), that involve higher risks with legal and
social consequences, compared to other strategies (soft protest behaviors, such as
petitions) which are also capable of addressing their grievances without foreseeable
consequences. This argument is evident by the Asian Barometer Survey.
Thus far, the findings suggest that presidentialism is associated with violent atti-
tude and violent behavior, leading to a reconsideration of the process of democratic
breakdown, which, as I will argue, is the key to address the puzzle of the relation-
ship between presidentialism and democratic breakdown. The existing literature
treats democratic survival as either the longevity of democracy, as measured by how
many years a democracy has survived, or a dichotomous treatment of breakdown
and survival in each regime year. But both treatments of democratic breakdown are
incomplete because they do not consider a precondition for democratic breakdown,
namely, a democratic crisis (political violence). I argue that democratic breakdown
is best analyzed as a two-step process. For a democracy to break down, the pres-
ence of a democratic crisis that presents a significant likelihood of overthrowing the
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current democratic regime is necessary, but not sufficient. By jointly analyzing the
conditions that contribute to the emergence of a crisis and those that contribute to
a breakdown (given the presence of a crisis), a better understanding of democratic
survival will be achieved.
Specifically, I argue that presidentialism contributes to political instability through
its institutions, which are associated with a greater likelihood of the emergence of
a democratic crisis, but this political instability does not further contribute to the
transition, if any, from a democratic crisis to a democratic breakdown. Using data
covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008, I demonstrate that presiden-
tial democracies are more likely to encounter crises than either parliamentary or
semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism does not
lead to a higher likelihood of breakdown. Thus, presidentialism is associated with a
higher likelihood of democratic breakdown, but only by affecting half of the process.
This limited effect may be part of the reasons why many empirical studies find no
statistical association between presidentialism and democratic breakdown.
1.2 Chapter Overview
1.2.1 Chapter Two: An Institutional Perspective of the Attitudinal Foundation of
Political Violence in Democracies
In the second chapter, I argue that political institutions play an important role in
shaping violent political attitudes. People are encouraged to consider the adoption of
violent behaviors to address their grievances because of a lack of political institutions
to resolve mismatched policy expectations between the government and the public.
In particular, the rigidity inherent in the government changes in presidential systems
generates incentives for discontents and potential rebels to consider taking undemo-
cratic (violent) means to either force a change or coerce the government to comply
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with their demands. To examine this mechanism, I conduct hierarchical analyses
using the World Value Survey (wave 3) to assess whether political institutions have
a significant impact on attitudes regarding the use of violence for political goals.
The evidence supports the theory and suggests that presidentialism enhances and
triggers people’s attitudes toward using violence.
1.2.2 Chapter Three: Presidentialism, Democratic Attitude, and Protest
Behaviors in East and Southeast Asian Democracies
Following the findings from the previous chapter, in this chapter, I distinguish
between two types of protest behaviors: soft and hard. Soft protest behaviors refer to
activities that are legally and culturally accepted for addressing personal grievances
in a given society, such as petitioning and social gathering. Hard protest behaviors
are activities that are legally and culturally prohibited, such as violent protests and
revolutionary undertakings. Political institutions have different effects on these two
types of protest behaviors. In particular, presidentialism encourages citizens to use
hard protest strategies because, as argued in chapter two, the rigidity of the govern-
ment to change incentivizes discontented citizens to adopt more extreme strategies
to present grievances that are less likely to be adequately addressed and resolved in
presidential systems. To examine these mechanisms, I conduct a series of analyses
using the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, which covers seven democra-
cies. The results support my theory that presidentialism is positively associated with
hard protest behaviors but has no relationship with soft protest behaviors. To fur-
ther explore this finding, I also investigate the relationship between types of protest
behaviors and democratic attitude. The results indicate that hard protest behaviors
are negatively associated with democratic attitude, whereas soft protest strategies
have a positive effect on democratic attitude.
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1.2.3 Chapter Four: Presidentialism, Democratic Crisis, and Democratic
Breakdown
Is presidentialism harmful to democratic consolidation? Despite two decades
of investigation, the empirical results are mixed. In contributing to this debate, I
propose that democratic breakdown is best understood as a two-step process, from
incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown. I argue that
presidentialism contributes to political instability through its institutions, which are
associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis, but that presidentialism does
not lead a democracy from a democratic crisis to a democratic breakdown. Using
data covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008, I demonstrate that presi-
dential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than parliamentary or semi-
presidential democracies. But once a crisis is present, presidentialism does not lead
to a greater likelihood of breakdown. Therefore, the findings suggest that Juan Linz
was correct about presidentialism generating unstable democracies, but this process
does not occur in the way he theorized.
1.3 Conclusion
This dissertation demonstrates that presidentialism is harmful to democratic con-
solidation by inducing political violence (attitude, behavior, and crisis). Evidence
from various sources, including public opinion surveys (the World Value Survey and
the Asian Barometer Survey) and a panel dataset covering all democratic regimes
from 1946 to 2008 with the regime year as the unit of analysis, suggests that presi-
dentialism is linked with political violence which damages democratic consolidation.
Though the results also conclude that presidentialism does not directly affect demo-
cratic breakdown, it has an indirect effect toward democratic breakdown through
democratic crisis (political violence).
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The policy implications of this paper are twofold. First, presidential systems gen-
erate political instability through the rigidity of altering incumbent government and
complicate democratic consolidation by encouraging political violence. New democ-
racies should generally avoid selecting presidentialism as their macro-institutional
design. Instead, they should choose parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism. Exist-
ing presidential democracies with a long history of democratic crises (e.g., Ecuador,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Peru) should perhaps switch their macro-institutional
design away from presidentialism through a substantial constitutional change. Insti-
tutional choice is an important factor affecting democratic consolidation.
Second, democratic breakdown needs to be understood as a two-step process, from
incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown. Policy makers,
government officials, and democratic observers should realize that the factors affect-
ing democratic crisis onset and democratic breakdown given a crisis are different.
When a democratic crisis occurs, intuitive factors such as economic indicators or in-
stitutional features are not capable of predicting whether the existing crisis will lead
to a regime change. The revised theory and results provide better indicators and
improved guidelines for understanding the full nature of democratic breakdowns.
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2. AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE ATTITUDINAL
FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN DEMOCRACIES
2.1 Introduction
Political violence, defined as any violent activity that is used to achieve political
goals, is considered a serious threat to the stability of any society. It is a type of
political participation and is commonly seen as a strategy to address grievances by
discontents and people who are dissatisfied with society or the government. As a
means to achieve a goal, political violence ranges from relatively non-violent behav-
iors, such as street protests and peaceful demonstrations, to activities resulting in
casualties, such as revolutions, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist attacks.
The foundation of democracy suggests that political violence should be an ex-
tremely rare event. Democracy is designed to peacefully channel public discontent
and provide broader political representation relative to its counterpart, dictatorship.
Regular elections ensure that government alternatives are provided and that differ-
ent voices can be heard. Thus, individuals who are dissatisfied with the status quo
can seek representation through elected legislators or government officials to address
their political concerns and demands. That is, if democracy functions perfectly,
then violent political activity will rarely occur (see Eisinger 1973; Hegre et al. 2001;
Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983). However, polit-
ical violence is not observed exclusively in authoritarian countries and transitional
regimes. For example, coup attempts in the Philippines have occurred regularly from
the latest democratization in 1986 to the present. Demonstrations and strikes are a
regular feature among those pursuing labor rights in South Korea (see Koo 2000).
Extreme right-wing movements, such as Nazism and anti-immigration activities, are
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regularly observed in developed European democracies (see Hainmueller and Hiscox
2007; McLaren 2003; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). Additionally, politi-
cal assassinations and violent protests are commonly observed in Latin American
democracies.
If democracy were designed for peaceful resolution between a government and its
people, then why would political violence constantly occur in democracies? To address
this question, I argue that a thorough understanding of the psychological/attitudinal
foundation of political violence is needed. Studies of political violence are usually
categorized by the type of violent behavior, such as civil war (e.g., Blattman and
Miguel 2010), coups (e.g., Clark 2007; Londregan and Poole 1990; Zald and Berger
1978), revolutions (e.g., Goldstone 2001; Hale 2013; Stinchcombe 1999; Tilly 1978),
protests (e.g., Morris and Mueller 1992; Robertson 2010; Della Porta et al. 2006), and
terrorism (e.g., Crenshaw 1981, 2000; Lake 2002; McCormick 2003; Schmid 2004).
Nevertheless, the attitudinal foundation of why people living in democratic societies
engage in violent activities for political purposes has not yet been thoroughly studied,
and an empirical assessment of why people living in democratic societies choose to
use violence as a means to achieve their political goals has not been conducted.
In this chapter, I argue that political institutions play an important role in shap-
ing violent political attitudes. People are encouraged to consider the adoption of
violent behaviors to address their grievances because there is a lack of political insti-
tutions that can resolve mismatched policy expectations between the government and
the public. In particular, the rigid process of changing the government in presidential
systems provides incentives for discontents and potential rebels to take undemocratic
(violent) means to either force governmental change or coerce the government to
comply with their demands. To further examine this theory, I conduct hierarchical
analyses using the World Value Survey (wave 3) to assess whether political institu-
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tions have a significant impact on attitudes regarding the use of violence for political
goals. The evidence supports the theory and suggests that presidentialism enhances
and triggers people’s attitudes toward using violence.
2.2 The Causes of Political Violence
Studies of political violence have provided numerous theories explaining why peo-
ple and groups, ordinary or not, engage in violent activities to address their political
opinions. Four types of theories can be identified within the literature on political vi-
olence: grievance, state repression, political opportunity structures, and institutional
strength. First, researchers have argued that the primary motivation for engaging
in political violence, such as protests and insurgencies, is psychological grievances
generated by economic inequality or deprivation (e.g., Buhaug and Cederman 2013;
Dabalen and Paul 2014; Davies 1962; Muller 1985), ethnic exclusion (e.g., Bhav-
nani et al. 2014; Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008; Cederman and Girardin 2007;
Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000; Wimmer 2002), or any perceived
frustration relating to social or economic factors (e.g., Gurr 1970; Schnytzer 1994).1
As a key driving force, grievances encourage individuals to express their practical
or perceived inequality through violent means. For example, in his study of demon-
strations, strikes, riots and other forms of political protest and violence, Gurr (1968,
1970) found that the national economic conditions, such as inflation rates and growth
rates for gross national product (GNP), are likely to produce feelings of relative depri-
vation. The influence of the economy is evident in the anti-immigration movements
in developed European democracies, which are justified by the argument that for-
eign immigrants have taken job opportunities that native citizens deserved. These
1Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) find that economic factors have stronger explanatory power for
political violence than these social and political variables. Nevertheless, both sets of variables can
be considered measurements of grievances.
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theories are considered a psychological explanation for political violence and one of
the fundamental arguments explaining the emergence of violent political behaviors.
Second, state repression has successfully explained the emergence and dissolution
of political violence (e.g., Besley and Persson 2009, 2011; Davenport 1995, 2007b;
Gurr 1986; Henderson 1991; Hoover 1992; Lichbach 1987; King 1998; Moore 1998,
2000; Muller 1985; Muller and Weede 1990; Pierskalla 2010; Rasler 1996; Regan and
Henderson 2002; Ziegenhagen 1986). According to Goldstein (1978, xvi), “political
repression consists of government action which grossly discriminates against persons
or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power
relationships or key government policies, because of their perceived political beliefs.”2
Repression in the form of, e.g., media censorship or state suppression of an ongoing
protest can simultaneously encourage and discourage civil violence. On the one hand,
state repression may generate more public discontent, resulting in an irreversible
revolution and additional public violence against the state (see Ziegenhagen 1986).
On the other hand, state repression may impose a higher cost for individuals and
groups who engage in political violence against the state, thus reducing observable
violent activities. In addition, studies of state repression in democracies have found
that democratic institutions are able to effectively reduce the level of state repression,
which constitutes “domestic democratic peace” (a lower level of violent behavior
within the state and society) (see Davenport 2007a; Russett 1993).
Political opportunity structures are the third type of theory explaining why peo-
ple adopt violent behaviors (e.g., Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006; Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Kitschelt 1986; Lichbach 1995; McAdam
1982; Meyer 2004; Skocpol 1979; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). The theory argues that
discontents are more likely to use violent strategies to achieve their political goals
2For greater detail, see Goldstein (1978, 1983).
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when they envision a higher likelihood of success. Assuming that potential rebels
behave rationally and aim to achieve their political goals successfully (e.g., regime
changes or forcing the government to change the status quo regarding particular pub-
lic policies), rebels will wait and prepare until the likelihood of success is at its peak.
For example, protests and revolutions are likely to be mobilized when the state’s
strength is declining (Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978) or when rebels perceive that there
will be a critical change in the government that may result in political instability
(McAdam 1982; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1994). Studies of political opportunity struc-
tures also reveal that democracy may have mixed effects on political violence. On the
one hand, democracy constrains state repression and ensures a certain level of toler-
ance regarding protests and other forms of violent behaviors, thus encouraging such
behaviors to address social grievances (Tarrow 1994). On the other hand, democratic
institutions allow political alternatives through regular elections and guarantee civil
liberties, thereby reducing political violence (Kitschelt 1986). Within a similar line
of studies, scholars note that resources are essential to sustain and mobilize violent
activities (Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon 2010; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994).
Organizational affiliations and personal wealth are important to form and mobilize
such behaviors.
The last type of theory explaining political violence is institutional strength. The
quality of political institutions is critical in the provision of public policies and legis-
lation. A better institutionalized government can ensure that public demands will be
made and that policy implementations will be adequate. Thus, scholars have argued
that institutional strength, such as an effective and accountable legislature, is more
likely to encourage discontents to address their political issues through regular non-
violent channels (e.g., voting and contacting elected representatives), whereas politi-
cal violence is more likely to be initiated when political institutions are incapable of
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resolving and addressing existing social grievances (e.g., Machado, Scartascini, and
Tommasi 2011). This phenomenon has been exemplified in some Latin American
countries (Eckstein 2001; Jemio, Candia, and Evio 2009; Mej´ıa Acosta et al. 2008).
The literature on political violence has explored various explanations for why dis-
contents in different societies strategically employ violent activities to achieve their
political goals. Nevertheless, researchers have not paid attention to the psychological
foundation underlying why people fight against the government in democratic coun-
tries, given that democracy is designed to resolve and address public grievances.3
Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2011) provide a possible explanation for the
variation of political violence in various democracies by arguing that institutional
strength plays a key role in shaping the likelihood of political violence. Based on
this profound finding, I argue that not only does institutional strength have ex-
planatory power over political violence, but the types of democratic institutions also
matter.
2.3 Institutions and Violence
Democracy is designed to channel various social groups within a society and
to provide equal political rights and opportunity for citizens to engage in politics.
Regular elections and party competition provide “alternatives” to both the majority
and minority.4 Therefore, unlike authoritarian regimes in which governments do not
rely on the consent of the people to rule and provide few or no political institutions
3The literature on political opportunity structures only notes that political violence is more
likely to emerge in transitional regimes, where the likelihood of success is higher (see Eisinger 1973;
Muller and Weede 1990).
4Scholars have debated between the procedural and the substantive views of democracy. The
procedural view of democracy classifies regimes by whether they provide sufficient democratic in-
stitutions and procedures for practicing democracy (e.g., elections), whereas the substantive view
of democracy classifies regimes by the outcomes that they produce (e.g., quality of governance).
Here, I employ the procedural view of democracy to avoid any possible confusion and lack of clar-
ity caused by the conceptualization of the substantive view of democracy. For a summary of the
debate, see Cohen (1997) and Dahl (1971).
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to share their ruling powers with others, regular elections in democratic regimes
guarantee that the rulers are replaceable through the choice of the people. That is,
democracy is designed to maximize the opportunity for representation of its people
by providing alternatives to ensure that most social groups can be heard.
Nevertheless, different political institutions result in different levels of represen-
tation. Although all democracies guarantee equal political participation and com-
petition, they vary in how political power is exercised in the government. When a
system allows executive and legislative institutions to incorporate and represent as
many social groups as possible in policy decision-making processes, then this system
acquires a higher level of political representation and ensures that most public inter-
ests will be heard and considered. When a system allows executive and legislative
institutions to utilize majority or plurality support as the foundation of the policy
decision-making process, then this system is likely to create issue divergence and
social conflicts because some minority groups will be left out of political decisions.
The first scenario refers to parliamentary systems, in which executive and legislative
powers are combined, and the second scenario refers to presidential systems, in which
executive and legislative powers are separated and compete with each other.
Within these two systems, the basic structures of power sharing differ (see Shugart
and Carey 1992).5 In presidentialism, the president holds the most political power
in government and does not need to share her power with other political actors, such
as other political parties, through coalitions. In parliamentary systems, the cabinet
must share power in accordance with the composition of the parliament to operate
and sustain majority support. Legislative responsibility, such as the right to initiate
5Semi-presidential systems are variants of these two systems. Some look more like presidentialism
if the president can remove the government or her party controls a legislative majority. Others are
more similar to parliamentarism if the president is not empowered to remove the government or
her party does not control a legislative majority (see Duverger 1980; Elgie 2011).
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a vote of no confidence, plays a key role in shaping the decision-making process.
The two systems are also distinct in their procedures for removing the incumbent
government/executive. In presidential systems, the president serves a fixed term that
is determined by the constitution, even if her policy preferences are unpopular with
the legislature and the people.6 In parliamentary systems, a legislative majority is
empowered to remove the government by either passing a vote of no confidence or
rejecting a vote of confidence initiated by the government.
Parliamentary systems, on the one hand, ensure that policy decisions and their
implementation match public expectations because legislative responsibility forces
the incumbent party or the government coalition to open negotiation with opposition
parties to avoid a vote of no confidence or an early election, which can dramatically
change the composition of the legislature. To avoid costs resulting from legislative
responsibility, such as the uncertainty of reelection after the dissolution of the par-
liament, incumbent governments and opposition parties have incentives to update
their policy preferences in accordance with the electorate and thus maximize the
likelihood of reelection. On the other hand, presidential systems are known to create
problems in democratic representation and consolidation (e.g., Boix 2003; Maeda
2010; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 1996, 2000; Sing 2010; Stephen
and Skach 1993; Svolik 2008). For example, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, pp.450-
451) summarize Linz’s (1990) original argument regarding problems in presidential
regimes and identify five general problems with presidentialism: “1) the executive
and legislature advance competing claims to legitimacy; 2) the fixed terms of office
make presidential regimes more rigid than parliamentary systems; 3) presidentialism
encourages winner-take-all outcomes; 4) the style of presidential politics encourages
6It is possible, in some constitutions, to impeach the president. However, the requirements for
an impeachment are usually difficult to achieve; thus, few presidents have ever been impeached.
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presidents to be intolerant of political opposition; and 5) presidentialism encourages
populist candidates.”7 In particular, fixed terms of presidential office with practi-
cal difficulties for impeachment and the winner-take-all nature with all executive
power held under elected presidents in presidential systems encourage presidents to
disregard some popular demands and to ignore minority social groups, resulting in
the tyranny of the majority (see Guinier 1994; Mill 1859[1913]; Sartori 1987). This
situation creates mismatched policy expectations between the government and the
public.
Both parliamentary and presidential systems can maintain their stability without
obstruction from political violence as long as no conflict-prone disagreements exist
among the various social groups. However, once such disagreements occur or poten-
tial rebels emerge, presidentialism encourages these discontents to consider violent
strategies because presidential systems impede immediate change or reshuﬄing of
the composition of the executive branches, which could incorporate these discon-
tents into democratic representation. Unlike parliamentary democracies, in which a
vote of no confidence with a cabinet reshuﬄe or a new election can spin the polit-
ical opinions of rebels into the process of representation through the possibility of
government alternation, there are no institutional means for the president to ease
tension except for her own resignation. That is, when public dissatisfaction toward
the president is high or demands from minority and under-represented groups cannot
be fulfilled, fixed terms of presidential office and the winner-take-all nature result in
an almost unchangeable president who retains all executive power. The structure
provides no mechanisms for a government alternation to resolve such a crisis. For
example, in 1996, President Kim Young-sam of South Korea attempted to imple-
ment a controversial labor law despite opposition from labor unions and opposition
7Elgie (2005) also presents a comprehensive summary of the curse of presidentialism.
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parties, resulting in strikes lasting for three months, with over three million people
on the street (Koo 2000). This situation provided incentives for minority groups and
the under-represented to consider undemocratic means to force the government to
negotiate. In sum, mismatched policy expectations between the government and the
public and institutional rigidity in changing the government composition in presiden-
tial democracies encourage individuals and social groups to consider violence as one
possible strategy to achieve their political goals. According to the theory, a testable
hypothesis can be derived from this argument:
H21: People in presidential systems are more likely to consider political violence
as a form of political participation.
2.4 Research Design
2.4.1 Data
In this study, I seek evidence for my theory through cross-national public opinion
surveys. The data being analyzed are the third wave (1994-1999) of the World Value
Survey (WVS).8 The WVS is a multi-wave cross-national survey investigating various
political attitudes and behaviors across democracies and non-democracies. Because
this study focuses exclusively on democratic countries and the theoretical argument
is based on the procedural view of democracy, I employ Democracy and Dictatorship
(DD) to classify democracies and non-democracies in the WVS (Cheibub, Gandhi,
and Vreeland 2010). DD identifies a regime as a democracy when all four of the
following criteria are met: “1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election
or by a body that was itself popularly elected. 2. The legislature must be popularly
elected. 3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections. 4.
An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the
8Only the third wave is adopted because this is the only wave that included the question regard-
ing violent political attitudes.
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incumbent to office must have taken place” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010,
p.69).9 DD yields 37 democracies and 51,638 respondents in the third wave of the
WVS, as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Democracies in the third wave of WVS.
Country Year N Violence Country Year N Violence
Albania 1998 999 1.41 Latvia 1996 1200 1.81
Argentina* 1995 1079 1.68 Lithuania 1997 1009 1.82
Armenia 1997 2000 1.85 Macedonia 1998 995 1.67
Australia 1995 2048 1.63 Moldova 1996 984 2.13
Bangladesh 1996 1525 1.13 New Zealand 1998 1201 1.60
Brazil* 1997 1149 1.34 Norway 1996 1127 1.28
Bulgaria 1997 1072 1.81 Philippines* 1996 1200 2.25
Chile* 1996 1000 1.82 Romania 1998 1239 1.90
Colombia* 1998 6025 1.99 Slovakia 1998 1095 1.95
Croatia 1996 1196 1.52 Slovenia 1995 1007 1.98
Czech R. 1998 1147 1.77 Spain 1995 1211 1.78
Dominican R.* 1996 417 2.50 Sweden 1996 1009 1.38
El Salvador* 1999 1254 1.97 Switzerland 1996 1212 1.44
Estonia 1996 1021 1.71 Turkey 1996 1907 1.74
Finland 1996 987 1.34 Ukraine 1996 2811 1.95
Germany 1996 2026 1.71 United States* 1995 1542 1.66
Hungary 1998 650 1.65 Uruguay* 1996 1000 1.77
India 1995 2040 1.67 Venezuela* 1996 1200 2.01
Japan 1995 1054 1.54
Source: World Values Survey.
Note: Countries marked with asterisk are presidential democracies.
9Using DD to classify democracies and dictatorships offers advantages over alternative data
sets because of its dichotomous measure of democracy. Other popular indicators of democracy,
such as POLITY IV and Freedom House, evaluate the levels of democracy for each country based
on continuous measures of democracy and thus pose difficulty in defining the critical threshold
separating democracy from non-democracy. Moreover, Freedom House includes some substantive
aspects of democracy, such as the quality of governance and corruption, which may not capture the
core aspects indicated in the theory. Thus, it makes intuitive sense to adopt DD for this study.
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2.4.2 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is Political violence, measured as the respondents’ re-
sponses to a four-point scale (1-4) agree-or-disagree question (E198): ‘Using violence
to pursue political goals is never justified.’ Higher values indicate that respondents
believe that using violence for political goals is justified. Political violence represents
the extent to which respondents are willing to consider using violent strategies for
political purposes attitudinally. Unlike most studies that focus on actual political
violence, such as civil war (e.g., Blattman and Miguel 2010), protest (e.g., Morris
and Mueller 1992; Robertson 2011; Della Porta et al. 2006), and terrorism (e.g.,
Crenshaw 1981, 2000; Lake 2002; McCormick 2003; Schmid 2004), this study inves-
tigates the psychological foundation of political violence empirically. The average of
Political violence for each country is also reported in Table 2.1.10
2.4.3 Independent Variables
I employ Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon’s (2010) model, which explores the rela-
tionship between economic and political conditions and protest behavior with the
third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey, as the baseline model to in-
vestigate the relationship between presidentialism and violent political attitudes.11
The variables included in the individual-level analysis are designed to incorporate
various theoretical expectations in the study of political violence. First, to access
the effect of grievances on violent political attitudes in the individual-level analysis,
I include Life satisfaction and Trust in parliament.12 Higher Life satisfaction and
10Response weights are applied.
11The dependent variable in their study, protest behavior, is the number of those participating
in the following activities: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations,
joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. For details, see Dalton, Sickle, and
Weldon (2010).
12Life satisfaction: ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these
days? Please use this card to help with your answer. (1) dissatisfied to (10) satisfied.’ Trust in
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Trust in parliament are expected to reduce psychological attachment to political vi-
olence. Furthermore, resources are expected to enhance the willingness to consider
the adoption of violent strategies. Education and Group membership are employed to
measure respondents’ level of resources.13 Lastly, variables assessing political values
and cultures are included (Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon 2010). These variables are
Left/Right ideology and Post-materialism.14
To examine the hypothesis that presidentialism is positively associated with vi-
olent political attitudes, I also include variables assessing political institutions, eco-
nomic development, and levels of democracy at the country level. The first set
of variables is political institutions, including Presidential dummy and PR system.
Presidential dummy, which is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if and only if the
head of state is popularly elected and is not responsible to the legislature, is the
key variable examining the hypothesis of my argument.15 According to Saideman et
al. (2002), PR system can effectively reduce political violence.16 The second set of
variables is economic development assessed by GDP per capita (1,000/ppp).17 Lower
parliament : ‘I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very
much confidence or none at all? Parliament.’ The responses are recoded as (4) a great deal to (1)
not at all. Trust in parliament is employed to estimate political trust or government satisfaction,
which is consistent with previous analyses (see Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon 2010; Klingemann 1999).
13Education: ‘What is the highest educational level that you have attained?’ with categories
ranging from (1) less than elementary education to (8) university degree or advanced degree.
Group membership reflects the total number of active or inactive memberships in the following
organizations: church or religious organization, sports or recreational organization, art, music,
or educational organization, political party, environmental organization, professional organization,
charitable or humanitarian organization, or any other organization. The variable ranges from (0)
no organizations to (9) all nine types of organizations.
14Left/Right ideology : ‘In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place
yourself on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means the left and 10 means the right?’ Post-materialism:
the four-item values index provided by the World Value Survey: (1) materialist, (2) mixed, (3)
post-materialist.
15Data are obtained from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).
16PR system is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a proportional representation system is used
for national legislative elections and 0 otherwise. The data are obtained from Norris (2009).
17The variable ranges from 1.61 to 37.12. Data are obtained from Heston, Summers and Aten
(2009).
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levels of economic development are likely to enhance income inequality and relative
deprivation, resulting in higher levels of political violence (see Alesina and Perotti
1996; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Piaza 2006; Weede 1987). The third set of vari-
ables is democratic levels, including Polity score and Freedom score.18 According to
the literature, higher levels of democracy are associated with lower levels of political
violence (see Eisinger 1973; Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler,
Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983). All country-level variables are measured with respect
to the year when the survey was conducted in each country.
2.4.4 Missing Values
To maximize the number of observations, the variables on the individual level are
imputed.19 To overcome potential biases created by missing values, I use multiple
imputation with chained equations (MICE) including all individual-level variables
(independent and dependent). MICE is capable of generating imputed values based
on a distributional assumption with respect to each variable (see King et al. 2001;
Lee and Carlin 2010; Royston and White 2011). For example, Political violence and
Trust in parliament are imputed with the ordered logistic model, whereas Group
membership is imputed with the linear regression model (normal distribution).
2.4.5 Estimation: Hierarchical Linear Modeling
To assess whether attitudes toward political violence are higher in presidential
democracies, I employ hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to account for cross-
national variation resulting from institutional designs. HLM offers numerous advan-
tages over other estimations, including correct estimation of standard errors, limited
18Polity score is a continuous variable ranging between -10 and 10; higher values indicate more
democratic levels (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). Freedom score is a continuous variable
ranging between 1 and 7; higher values indicate more freedom.
19Without imputation, the empirical analysis loses 60% of the observations.
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aggregation bias, and straightforward estimation regarding cross-level interactions
between individuals and countries. (see Hox 2002; Park and Lake 2006; Raudenbush
and Bryk 2001). Respondents weights are also incorporated into the construct of the
standard errors. To ease the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, I assume
that the dependent variable, Political violence, is an interval variable and apply the
linear regression assumption (the normal distribution assumption).20 The model is
specified as
y = Xβ + ε
β0i = Ziγ + µ,
(2.1)
where y is a vector of the dependent variable, Political violence, X is the matrix of
individual-level independent variables, β is the vector of individual-level coefficients,
β0i is the coefficient of the constant at the individual level for each country, Zi
is the matrix of country-level independent variables, γ is the vector of country-
level coefficients, and ε and µ are error vectors at the individual and country levels,
respectively.
As shown in Equation 2.1, all of the individual variables except intercepts are
modeled as fixed parameters. Country-specific intercepts (random intercepts) are
designed to account for cross-national differences in Political violence explained by
country-level variables. When analyzing any HLM, multicollinearity can impose a
significant difficulty in generating valid coefficients and standard errors. Thus, the
individual-level variables are grand-mean centered to avoid collinearity and to provide
intuitive interpretations for estimates (see Hofmann 1997; Hofmann and Gavin 1998;
Kreft et al. 1995; Raudenbush and Bryk 2001). I also interact Presidential dummy
with individual-level variables as a random-intercept random-slope model to examine
20The dependent variable is an ordinal variable, implying that an ordered logistic or probit model
is more appropriate. Nevertheless, the results from the ordered logistic HLM are identical to those
from the linear regression HLM.
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any possible interactive effect between the individual factors and presidentialism.
The model then is re-specified as
y = Xβ + ε
β = Ziγ + µ.
(2.2)
2.5 Empirical Results
Table 2.2 presents the empirical estimates for Equation 2.1. The total number of
observations is 51,638 across 37 democracies.21 The F test is significant at the 0.01
level, supporting the overall model performance for each model specification. Using
the grand-mean centered method, the coefficients of Intercept at the individual level
indicate the predicted value of Political violence holding all individual variables at
their means.22 An intuitive interpretation of the violent attitude of an ordinary
respondent with average scores on all the variables can thus be made.
Model 1 in Table 2.2 represents the pooled data individual-level analysis without
any country-level variable, whereas Model 2 in Table 2.2 represents the same estima-
tion with country-fixed effects.23 Using country-fixed effects in the analysis allows
the estimation to incorporate unspecified “between country differences” and thus to
enhance the validity of the estimates. Once the country-specific effects are taken
into account, Trust in parliament and Group membership, which are significant in
Model 1, become insignificant in Model 2. The negative and significant effects of Life
satisfaction and Post-materialism remain. Based on the estimates from Model 2, in-
creasing Life satisfaction from the minimum (1) to the maximum (10) will reduce
Political violence by 0.1. Post-materialism has a similar impact (0.14) on Political
21No missing observations exist after multiple imputations.
22The range of Political violence is between 1 and 4.
23This is equivalent to a random-intercept fixed-slope HLM.
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Table 2.2: The HLM estimates of Political violence.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Individual level
Life satisfaction -0.012** -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trust in parliament -0.043** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Education 0.002 -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**
0.002 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Group membership -0.024** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
L-R ideology 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post-materialism -0.048** -0.031** -0.031** -0.031** -0.031**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Intercept 1.977** 1.551** 1.551** 2.594** 2.841**
(0.024) (0.036) (0.036) (0.146) (0.196)
Country-level
Presidential dummy – – 0.590** 1.103** 1.255**
– – (0.041) (0.102) (0.131)
PR system – – – -0.431** -0.666**
– – – (0.055) (0.088)
GDP per capita – – – -0.023** -0.029**
– – – (0.003) (0.003)
Polity score – – – -0.110** –
– – – (0.023) –
Freedom score – – – – -0.218**
– – – – (0.046)
Number of groups 37
Number of observations 51638
F test 34.78** 81.61** 81.61** 81.61** 81.61**
Source: World Values Survey.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.05, **0.01.
violence when moving from materialist values (1) to post-materialist values (3). Ed-
ucation is negatively significant at the 0.05 level in Model 2, indicating that people
are less likely to consider using violence for political goals if they have a higher level
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of education. The initial results from Models 1 and 2 are consistent with the theo-
retical expectation, which argues that grievances are positively linked with political
violence, although Education and Post-materialism have a reverse direction from
Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon’s (2010) findings. This difference may be due to the fact
that considerations about the use of violence (attitudes) and the practical use of
violence (behavior) involve distinct risk calculations. In particular, the formation of
violent behavior requires resources such as organizational participation and various
skills. However, considering using violence does not require those resources. Thus,
factors measuring resources may have distinct effects for violent attitudes and violent
behaviors.
Models 3, 4, and 5 in Table 2.2 represent the HLM estimates of Political vio-
lence with country-level factors. Model 3 includes Presidential dummy only, whereas
Models 4 and 5 incorporate other country-level variables with Polity score and Free-
dom score, respectively.24 The estimates of these models indicate that Presidential
dummy is positively significant at the 0.01 level, and the effect is substantial. Ac-
cording to Model 4, the mean estimate of Political violence for people in presidential
democracies is 1.1 higher than it is for those in non-presidential systems. Because the
dependent variable ranges between 1 and 4, the magnitude of the coefficient of Pres-
idential dummy indicates a 25% increase in Political violence. Other country-level
variables also coincide with the theoretical expectations. As found by Saideman et al.
(2002), PR system is negatively linked to Political violence. In addition, grievances
(GDP per capita) and democracy (Polity score and Freedom score) are negatively
significant for explaining violent political attitudes. For example, adding 1,000 (ppp)
to GDP per capita can reduce individual violent attitudes by 0.02 (0.03 in Model 5),
24Polity score and Freedom score are highly collinear (r = 0.6), which may result in incorrect
estimates for standard errors. Thus, I estimate them separately.
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and enhancing the level of democracy (Polity score) can reduce individual violent
attitudes by 0.1 (0.2 for Freedom score). The estimates for Models 3 to 5 support H21
that presidentialism is associated with a higher level of violent political attitudes.
Most factors explaining violent political behavior in the literature are also powerful
predictors of violent political attitudes.
Table 2.3: The HLM estimates of Political violence with interactions.
Coeff. s.e.
Life satisfaction -0.005* (0.003)
Interaction with Presidential dummy -0.001 (0.005)
Trust in parliament 0.000 (0.007)
Interaction with Presidential dummy -0.019 (0.012)
Education -0.009** (0.003)
Interaction with Presidential dummy 0.006 (0.005)
Group membership -0.012* (0.006)
Interaction with Presidential dummy 0.028** (0.010)
L-R ideology -0.001 (0.003)
Interaction with Presidential dummy 0.004 (0.005)
Post-materialism -0.026** (0.009)
Interaction with Presidential dummy -0.013 (0.018)
Presidential dummy 0.592** (0.067)
Constant 1.542** (0.040)
Number of groups 37
Number of observations 51638
F test 70.11**
Source: World Values Survey.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.05, **0.01.
Table 2.3 represents the empirical estimates of Equation 2.2. Presidential dummy
remains significant, and the coefficient is identical to that in Model 3 of Table 2.2.
The most significant deviation between Tables 2.2 and 2.3 is that Group member-
ship and its interaction with Presidential dummy become significant. As presented
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Figure 2.1: The interactive effect between Presidential dummy and Group member-
ship on Political violence.
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in Figure 2.1, where the horizontal axis represents Group membership and the ver-
tical axis represents the dependent variable, Political violence, the total number of
organizational memberships has a positive impact on Political violence in presiden-
tial democracies, whereas the effect becomes negative in non-presidential systems.
Although the effect of Group membership is not as substantial as the effect of Pres-
idential dummy, the results imply that, as a type of political and social resource,
organizational membership triggers a higher level of violent attitudes in presidential
systems. This result may be due to the fact that grievances are higher in presiden-
tial democracies; thus, participation in various organizations facilitates the spread of
grievances among members.25
25Within the data, the average of Trust in parliament and GDP per capita in non-presidential
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2.6 Presidentialism and Violent Behavior?
Research on political violence has focused almost exclusively on the practices of
political violence or violent behaviors. However, it is important to understand the
driving force behind violent behaviors, or the psychological foundation of political
violence. In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between violent attitudes
and political institutions in democracies. I argue that certain political institutions
encourage the public to consider using violence to achieve their political goals when
a mismatched policy expectation exists between the government and the public. In
particular, I argue that presidentialism is positively associated with violent political
attitudes because the rigidity of government changes in presidential systems gener-
ates political instability and provides incentives for discontents and potential rebels
to take undemocratic (violent) means to force a governmental change or compliance
with their demands. To assess this argument, I conduct a hierarchical analysis using
the third wave of the World Value Survey and investigate the relationships between
violent attitudes and various individual- and country-level variables, including vari-
ables measuring regime performance and political institutions. The result supports
my theory that presidentialism contributes positively and significantly to violent
political attitudes.
It is natural to ask a follow-up question: does presidentialism also have a positive
effect on violent behavior? To investigate this relationship, I estimate two HLM mod-
els using Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon’s (2010) model as the baseline model, with a
country-level variable, Presidential dummy. The dependent variable is Protest index,
which is a count of the number of activities performed by the respondent, ranging
from 0 to 5.26 These activities are signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending
systems is 0.2 and 2,500 (ppp) higher than the averages in presidential systems, respectively.
26The Protest index is also imputed by MICE.
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lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or facto-
ries. Table 2.4 shows the results of this estimation. Model 1 represents the Poisson
HLM estimates, and Model 2 represents the negative binomial HLM estimates. The
negative binomial HLM is employed to identify whether a response of 0 in Protest
index means that the respondent did not participate in any of these events or the
respondent did not want to reveal his true experience.27 As demonstrated in the sig-
nificance of the over-dispersion parameter, a response of 0 in Protest index is likely to
have multiple meanings. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates and standard errors
are identical between Models 1 and 2.
Table 2.4: The HLM estimates of Protest index.
Model 1 Model 1
Life satisfaction -0.012** (0.003) -0.012** (0.003)
Trust in parliament -0.003 (0.009) -0.003 (0.009)
Education 0.106** (0.003) 0.107** (0.003)
Group memberships 0.149** (0.005) 0.159** (0.005)
L-R ideology -0.050** (0.004) -0.048** (0.004)
Post-materialism 0.265** (0.012) 0.268** (0.012)
Presidential dummy -0.469** (0.079) -0.490** (0.079)
Intercept -1.198** (0.066) -1.204** (0.066)
Over-dispersion parameter – – 0.284** (0.014)
Number of groups 37
Number of observations 51638
F test 275.20** 264.14**
Source: World Values Survey.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.05,
**0.01.
The estimates at the individual level are mostly identical to Dalton, Sickle, and
27A total of 60% of the respondents (after MICE) reported that they did not participate in any
of these events.
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Weldon’s (2010) findings. However, Presidential dummy reveals a sharp difference
for violent behavior and violent attitude. Instead of a positive effect for violent at-
titude, Presidential dummy is negatively associated with violent behavior (Protest
index ), indicating that people are less likely to fight against the state or the govern-
ment in presidential democracies. Assuming that the willingness to consider using
violence for political goals is the driving force of violent behavior, the results from
Table 2.4 are inconsistent with my theoretical argument. However, as I argue in the
next chapter, the existing indicators measuring violent behavior are imperfect. In
particular, some behaviors may encompass different levels of risk between democra-
cies and dictatorships. As shown in the activities constructing Protest index, these
activities include signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demon-
strations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. Signing a
petition, joining in boycotts, and attending lawful demonstrations are legally allowed
in democracies, whereas in dictatorships, these activities may imply some uncertainty
and political consequences for participants and could be considered violence. Thus,
when dictatorships are excluded in the theory and the analysis, a revised typology
and an indicator of violent behavior is needed. Using the third wave of the Asian
Barometer Survey (ABS), the next chapter separates violent behavior into two types,
soft and hard, and finds that presidentialism has a positive and significant effect on
hard violent behavior but not on the soft type.
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3. PRESIDENTIALISM, DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDE, AND PROTEST
BEHAVIORS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEMOCRACIES
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter raises an interesting question: why does presidentialism
have a positive impact on violent attitudes but a negative effect on violent behaviors?
If psychological attitude is considered the driving force of behavior, then the mech-
anisms explaining violent attitudes and behaviors should show a consistent pattern.
Previous psychological research has found that attitude and behavior are closely con-
nected with one another (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1997; Bentler and Speckart 1979;
Feldman and Lynch 1988). Thus, the deviation in the findings regarding the rela-
tionship between presidentialism and violent attitudes and behaviors requires further
investigation.
To address this puzzle, I argue that violent behaviors or protest behaviors, such as
those addressing both personal and group grievances with the government, have wide
variation in terms of their intensity and their anticipated activities. In particular,
I argue that there are two different types of protest behaviors, soft and hard, and
that only hard protest behaviors are associated with presidentialism.1 To examine
these mechanisms, I conduct a series of analyses using the third wave of the Asian
Barometer Survey, which covers seven democracies. The results support my theory
that presidentialism is positively associated with hard protest behaviors but has no
relationship with soft protest behaviors. Democratic attitude plays an additive role in
explaining different types of protest behaviors. To expand this finding, I investigate
the relationship between types of protest behaviors and democratic attitude. The
1Protest behaviors and violent behaviors are used interchangeably.
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results indicate that hard protest behaviors are negatively associated with democratic
attitude, whereas soft protest strategies have a positive effect on democratic attitude.
3.2 Presidentialism and Types of Protest Behaviors
As noted in the previous chapter, studies of political violence are typically cate-
gorized by violent behaviors, such as civil war (e.g., see Blattman and Miguel 2010),
coup d’etat (e.g., see Clark 2007; Londregan and Poole 1990; Zald and Berger 1978),
revolution (e.g., Goldstone 2001; Hale 2013; Stinchcombe 1999; Tilly 1978), protest
(e.g., see Morris and Mueller 1992; Robertson 2010; Della Porta et al. 2006), and
terrorism (e.g., see Crenshaw 1981, 2000; Lake 2002; McCormick 2003; Schmid 2004).
When examining these different strategies as means to address individual and group
grievances, there is wide variation in terms of the intensity and severity of conse-
quences and the likelihood of succeeding in achieving a particular goal. Some protest
behaviors, such as petitioning and social gathering, are legally and culturally allowed.
Other behaviors are considered illegal and are discouraged by society, such as violent
protests and terrorist activities. I argue that these different types of protest behav-
iors can be classified into two general types: soft and hard. When choosing between
soft and hard protest behaviors, people choose the type that can successfully ad-
dress their grievances at minimum cost. As socially accepted behavior, soft protest
behaviors are less likely to be punished by the society or the government. However,
individuals using hard protest behaviors experience a higher level of risk and are
likely to be punished by the state. Thus, these behaviors are selected by people who
want to address more serious grievances against the government and society.
Soft protest behaviors, such as attending a lawful demonstration, writing and/or
endorsing a petition, and utilizing local connections to resolve social issues, are legally
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allowed and culturally appropriate and lack noticeable consequences in democracies.2
Because these actions do not severely threaten the government and society, they are
likely to be employed for less serious personal or community problems that involve
lower-level grievances. Individuals and groups who utilize this type of behavior do
not anticipate violent confrontations with either government or society. There are
two types of people who are likely to adopt soft protest strategies to address their
grievances. The first type is dissatisfied with minor social and political issues and be-
lieves that soft protest behaviors can adequately and successfully resolve problems.
The second type consists of those citizens who may have higher-level grievances
against the government and society and who may want to use institutionalized chan-
nels first to resolve their issues. People of the second type are likely to adopt more
extreme strategies to seek redress for their grievances if their demands are not satis-
fied by the government. Therefore, individuals and groups who engage in soft protest
behaviors either have minor issues with the government and society or choose to begin
with soft protest strategies to determine whether they will work.
Conversely, hard protest behaviors, such as violent protests, occupations of gov-
ernmental buildings, and other forms of extreme political actions, are legally and
culturally prohibited. These types of behaviors involve higher risks and legal conse-
quences. Individuals and groups who utilize these strategies may not be welcomed
by society and are likely to be punished by the legal system. With such high risks,
people who employ hard violent strategies are those who bear high-level grievances
against the state and society and are willing to face serious consequences, such as
imprisonment, fines, and social alienation. Legal and cultural consequences serve as
a brake to constrain people from using these strategies to address their grievances;
most people are not willing to risk suffering such consequences. In studies of political
2These lawful behaviors may still face unknown or unknowable consequences in dictatorships.
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violence, hard protest behaviors are typically understood to be rare events in any
given society, except for times in which collective grievances and social instability
have reached a tipping point (see Eisinger 1973; Bohara, Mitchell, and Nepal 2006;
Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Hegre et al. 2001; Kitschelt
1986; Lichbach 1995; McAdam 1982; Meyer 2004; Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler,
Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983; Skocpol 1979; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). A recent
student protest (known as the Sunflower Student Movement) against the cross-strait
agreement on trade in services in Taiwan demonstrates the difference between soft
and hard protest behaviors.
The Sunflower Student Movement began with a group of students and other
citizens who believed that the cross-strait agreement on trade in services between
China and Taiwan would damage the future of younger generations if ratified. Due to
the legislative gridlock between the incumbent and opposition parties, the reviewing
process of the cross-strait agreement on trade in services was bogged down in the
legislature’s Internal Administrative Committee for more than 90 days until March
18, 2014. According to Article 61 of the Legislative Yuan Functions Act, if the review
process had extended beyond 90 days, then the proposal would have been considered
reviewed and submitted to a plenary session for legislative voting. Thus, a practically
unreviewed agreement would have been ratified if passed in legislative voting. This
action infuriated some discontented citizens and resulted in the illegal occupation
of the legislative chamber in the Legislative Yuan (the Taiwanese parliament) from
March 18 to April 10, 2014, the occupation of the executive bureau on March 23
and 24 during that same year, and the eventual eviction of the aggrieved citizens
by the police force. Both incidents–occupying the legislative chamber inside the
Legislative Yuan and occupying the executive bureau–are illegal, and the participants
are facing legal charges from the Taiwanese government. This type of resistance is
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considered hard protest behavior because the legal consequences are clear. During
the Sunflower Student Movement, the leaders of those individuals who occupied the
legislative chamber inside the Legislative Yuan called for a rally against the cross-
strait agreement on trade in services on Ketagalan Boulevard in Taipei, which is
located directly in front of the presidential office. The rally was legally approved by
the government, and approximately 500,000 people appealed and participated. This
rally is considered a soft protest behavior because there are no known legal or social
consequences for such rallies. As demonstrated in this case, the line separating soft
from hard protest behaviors is not based on the issue and type of grievances but by
the presence of consequences for the participants.
Unlike dictatorships, which do not guarantee peaceful consequences for soft protest
behaviors and typically punish hard protest behavior with extreme consequences
(e.g., the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 in China), democracies ensure that soft
protest behaviors are considered to be squarely within an institutionalized channel
that is meant to address social and political grievances. Thus, soft protest behaviors
can be considered ‘regular’ and ‘normal’ methods of displaying social unrest with-
out disturbing social harmony. However, the risks and consequences associated with
hard protest strategies ensure that these behaviors will be adopted only when the
grievance level is high. Democratic institutions play an important role in shaping
the adoption of hard protest behaviors. Consider a scenario in which some citizens
have high levels of social or political grievances against an incumbent government.
These high levels of grievances, which may be the result of different policy prefer-
ences between the government and the public or macro environmental factors, such as
economic depression, existing distributional injustice, or damages caused by natural
disasters, stimulate and mobilize discontented citizens against the government. In
a parliamentary system, potential conflicts between the incumbent government and
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the public can be resolved by a government reshuﬄe and a call for a new election
through the mechanism of legislative responsibility, such as a vote of no confidence.3
Thus, within the functions of legislative responsibility, potential conflicts in the form
of hard protest behaviors are less likely to occur because the government can be
brought down and recomposed according to public preferences.
However, presidential systems do not have the same function of legislative re-
sponsibility. Research on democratic consolidation has condemned presidential sys-
tems for decades (see Boix, 2003; Maeda, 2010; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and
Limongi, 1996, 2000; Sing, 2010; Stephen and Skach, 1993; Svolik, 2008).4 An elected
president is empowered to serve for a fixed term (e.g., four or six years) and is not
required to share her executive power with other political actors, such as opposition
parties. This situation applies to both majority and minority governments. When
social or political grievances against the incumbent government are high, there is no
institutional channel to alter the existing government composition.5 Thus, discon-
tented citizens in presidential democracies must wait until the next scheduled election
to remove an incumbent president. Unlike the situation in parliamentary democra-
cies, in which potential conflicts and societal pressures can be resolved by bringing
down and reforming the government, possible conflicts and grievances in presidential
systems are likely to accumulate because it is difficult to alter government compo-
sition that matches the public’s preferences. Thus, hard protest behaviors are more
3Legislative responsibility is also applied to semi-presidential systems. See Duverger (1980) and
Elgie (2011).
4For example, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, pp.450-451) summarize Linz’s (1990) original
argument regarding problems in presidential regimes and identify five general problems of presi-
dentialism: “1) the executive and legislature advance competing claims to legitimacy; 2) the fixed
terms of office make presidential regimes more rigid than parliamentary systems; 3) presidentialism
encourages winner-take-all outcomes; 4) the style of presidential politics encourages presidents to
be intolerant of political opposition; and, 5) presidentialism encourages populist candidates.” Elgie
(2005) also has a comprehensive summary of the curse of presidentialism.
5It is possible, in some constitutions, to impeach the president. However, the obstacles to an
impeachment are typically difficult to overcome; thus, few presidents have ever been impeached.
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likely to be adopted in presidential systems. According to this theory, a testable
hypothesis can be derived from this argument:
H31: Citizens in presidential systems are more likely to adopt hard protest behav-
iors.
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Data
In this study, I examine my theory through cross-national public opinion surveys.
I employ the third wave (2010) of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS).6 Because this
study focuses exclusively on democratic countries and the theoretical argument is
based on the procedural view of democracy, I employ the Democracy and Dictator-
ship (DD) index to classify democracies and non-democracies in the ABS (Cheibub,
Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). DD identifies a regime as a democracy when all four
of the following criteria are met: ‘1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular
election or by a body that was itself popularly elected. 2. The legislature must be
popularly elected. 3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections.
4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought
the incumbent to office must have taken place’ (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
2010, p.69).7 As a result, DD yields seven democracies and 10,151 respondents in
6Data analyzed in this chapter were collected by the Asian Barometer Project (2010-2012),
which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding sup-
port from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The
Asian Barometer Project Office (www.asianbarometer.org) is solely responsible for the data dis-
tribution. The author appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals
aforementioned. The views expressed herein are the author’s own.
7Using DD to classify democracies and dictatorships offers advantages over alternative data
sets because of its dichotomous measure of democracy. Other popular indicators of democracy,
such as POLITY IV and Freedom House, evaluate levels of democracy in each country based on
continuous measures of democracy and confront the difficulty of defining the critical threshold
separating democracy from non-democracy. Moreover, Freedom House includes some substantive
aspects of democracy, such as the quality of governance and corruption, which may not capture the
core aspects indicated in my argument. Thus, it makes intuitive sense to adopt DD for this study.
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the third wave of the ABS, as shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Democracies in the third wave of ABS.
Country Sample No response Soft Hard
Indonesia* 1550 50.19 42.31 7.49
Japan 1880 52.98 44.57 2.45
Mongolia 1210 71.24 22.31 6.45
South Korea* 1207 77.83 16.67 5.50
Philippines* 1200 69.67 21.08 9.25
Taiwan 1512 75.55 18.73 5.72
Thailand 1550 40.29 52.77 6.94
Source: Asian Barometer Survey.
Note: Countries marked with asterisk are presidential
democracies. Entries for ‘No response’, ‘Soft,’ and ‘Hard’
are percentages of respondents in each country.
Using the ABS to study soft and hard protests provides several advantages. First,
it allows for the observation of differences between presidential democracies (Indone-
sia, the Philippines, and South Korea) and non-presidential democracies (Mongolia,
Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand). Second, it allows comparison between the economi-
cally developed East Asian democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and the
economically developing Southeast Asian democracies (Indonesia, Philippines, and
Thailand).8 Third, the third wave of the ABS provides a good battery of items
measuring soft and hard protest behaviors that fit into the Asian context. Fourth,
the ABS incorporates questions measuring respondents’ attitudes toward democracy
and democratic systems. Finally, except for Japan, all democracies in this survey
are new democracies with democratic systems that have been in place for periods
8Grievances are a key explanation for political violence (e.g., Buhaug and Cederman 2013;
Dabalen and Paul 2014; Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Muller 1985; Schnytzer 1994).
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ranging from eight years (Indonesia) to 22 years (the Philippines) as of 2010.
3.3.2 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is Protest behavior, which is a categorical index generated
from four items: ‘Got together with others to try to resolve local problems,’ ‘Got
together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition,’ ‘Attended a demonstration
or protest march,’ and ‘Used force or violence for a political cause.’ Respondents
who reported that they had never participated in any of these activities are coded
as 0 (no response), those who had participated in either of the first two activities
(gathering together or signing a petition) without participating in the remaining two
(protesting and using violence) are coded as 1 (soft protest behaviors), and those
who had participated in either of the last two activities (protesting or using violence)
with or without engaging in soft protest behaviors (gathering together and signing a
petition) are coded as 2 (hard protest behaviors). The framing of survey questions
for soft protest behaviors demonstrates an Asian way of addressing and resolving
individual and group grievances in a peaceful manner that is commonly accepted in
these societies, whereas protests, demonstrations, and violence are considered illegal
and culturally prohibited in Asian societies. Table 3.1 shows the percentages of
respondents in each category (no response, soft protest behaviors, and hard protest
behaviors).
3.3.3 Independent Variables
Following the approach used in chapter two, I again employ Dalton, Sickle, and
Weldon’s (2010) model, which explores the relationship between economic and po-
litical conditions and protest behavior with the third and fourth waves of the World
Values Survey as the baseline model to investigate the relationship between pres-
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identialism and protest behaviors.9 As demonstrated, using their measurement of
protest behavior resulted in the finding that presidentialism has a negative effect on
political violence. I argue that protest behaviors must be separated into two types,
soft and hard. Thus, the puzzle of why presidentialism has a positive effect on violent
attitudes but a negative effect on violent behavior can be solved.
The ABS does not include the same items as the WVS. To approximate Dalton,
Sickle, and Weldon’s (2010) model, I use the following variables: Income satisfac-
tion, Trust in parliament, Education, Group membership, and Social status. Income
satisfaction is a replacement of life satisfaction and is measured on a four-point
scale with higher values indicating higher satisfaction with respondents’ household
income.10 Trust in parliament is a four-point scale with higher values indicating
higher support for the government.11 Income satisfaction and Trust in parliament
are used to examine the influence of personal grievances on protest behaviors. Ed-
ucation is a continuous variable ranging from (1) indicating no formal education to
(17) indicating post-graduate education, and Group membership is the total number
of the top three most important organizations with which the respondents are affili-
ated.12 These two variables are employed to explain the effect of personal resources on
protest behaviors. The ABS does not include the self-reported measurement of left-
9The dependent variable in their study, protest behavior, is the number of the following activities
in which respondents participated: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demon-
strations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. For detail, see Dalton,
Sickle, and Weldon (2010.
10Income satisfaction: ‘Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover
your needs?’ The responses are: (4) ‘Our income covers the needs well, we can save,’ (3) ‘Our income
covers the needs all right, without much difficulty,’ (2) ‘Our income does not cover the needs, there
are difficulties,’ and (1) ‘Our income does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties.’
11Trust in parliament : ‘I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me
how much trust do you have in them? Trust in parliament.’ The responses are: (4) ‘A Great Deal,’
(3) ‘Quite a Lot of Trust,’ (2) ‘Not Very Much Trust,’ and (1) ‘None at all.’
12Group membership: ‘Could you identity the three most important organizations or formal
groups you belong to?’ The variable is coded between (0) to (3) with respect to the number of
responses to ‘first organization,’ ‘second organization,’ and ‘third organization’ affiliations.
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right ideology or a measurement of post-materialism. Therefore, I use self-reported
subjective social status (Social status) ranging from (1) indicating the lowest sta-
tus to (10) indicating the highest status as a replacement for ideological left-right.
Higher social status is a proxy for right-wing ideology, whereas lower social status is
a proxy for left-wing ideology.
To examine the hypothesis that presidentialism is positively associated with vio-
lent political attitudes, I include variables assessing political institutions, economic
development, and levels of democracy at the country level. The first set of variables
consists of political institutions, including Presidential dummy and PR system. Pres-
idential dummy, which is a dichotomous variable, is coded 1 if and only if the head
of state is popularly elected and is not responsible to the legislature; this variable
is the key to examining the hypothesis of my argument.13 According to Saideman
et al. (2002), PR system can effectively reduce political violence.14 The second set
of variables consists of economic development indicators assessed by GDP per capita
(1,000/ppp).15 A lower level of economic development is likely to enhance income
inequality and relative deprivation, resulting in higher levels of political violence (i.e.,
hard protest behaviors) (see Alesina and Perotti 1996; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002;
Piaza 2006; Weede 1987). The third set of variables is democratic levels, includ-
ing Polity score and Freedom score.16 According to the literature, higher levels of
democracy are associated with lower levels of political violence (see Eisinger 1973;
Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983).
All country-level variables are measured with respect to the year (2010) when the
13Data are obtained from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).
14PR system is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if proportional representation system is used
for national legislative elections and 0 otherwise. The data were collected by the author.
15The variable ranges from 2.95 to 35.7. The data were collected by the author.
16Polity score is a continuous variable ranging from -10 to 10, where higher values indicate a more
democratic system (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013). Freedom score is a continuous variable
ranging between 1 and 7; higher values indicate more freedom.
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survey was conducted in each country.
3.3.4 Missing Values
To maximize the number of observations, the variables at the individual level are
imputed.17 To overcome potential biases created by missing values, I use multiple
imputation with chained equations (MICE) with all individual-level variables (inde-
pendent and dependent). MICE is capable of generating imputed values based on
each variable’s distributional assumption (see King et al. 2001; Lee and Carlin 2010;
Royston and White 2011). For example, Protest behavior is imputed with respect
to a multinomial logistic distribution, and Trust in parliament is imputed with an
ordered logistic model.
3.3.5 Estimation: Multinominal Logistic Regression
To examine the impact of presidentialism on hard protest behaviors, I estimate
a series of multinomial logistic regression models using no response (Protest behav-
ior = 0) as the base. The multinomial logistic regression model is designed for
categorically dependent variables, which apply to Protest behavior. Unlike the hi-
erarchical linear modeling (HLM) used in chapter two to account for cross-national
variation, I do not employ a HLM strategy in analyzing Protest behavior because of
the low number of countries (7), which limits cross-national variation. Therefore, I
include those country-level variables as regular regressors without manipulating the
variance-covariance estimates between the individual and country levels. Respon-
dents’ weights are also incorporated into the construct of the standard errors. The
17Without imputation, the empirical analysis loses 60% of observations.
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model can be specified as
ln
(
P (Protest behavior=1)
P (Protest behavior=0)
)
=
k∑
i=0
β1iXi +
m∑
j=0
γ1iZi
ln
(
P (Protest behavior=2)
P (Protest behavior=0)
)
=
k∑
i=0
β2iXi +
m∑
j=0
γ2iZi,
(3.1)
where ln
(
P (Protest behavior=1)
P (Protest behavior=0)
)
represents the likelihood of choosing soft protest be-
haviors compared to no response, ln
(
P (Protest behavior=2)
P (Protest behavior=0)
)
is the likelihood of choosing
hard protest behaviors compared to no response, β1i and β2i are coefficient estimates
of individual-level regressors Xi regarding soft and hard protest behaviors, respec-
tively, and γ1i and γ2i are coefficient estimates of country-level regressors Zi regarding
soft and hard protest behaviors, respectively.
3.4 Empirical Results
Table 3.2 represents the estimates of Protest behavior without country-level in-
stitutional and economic indicators. There are 10,151 observations across seven
democracies in East and Southeast Asia. Model 1 explores the effects of those indi-
vidual factors, whereas Model 2 includes country-fixed effects to eliminate possible
country-specific confounding factors. The coefficient estimates of Model 2 show that
there are consistent patterns explaining soft and hard protest behaviors. According
to Model 2, Education, Group memberships, and Social status all have positive and
significant effects on Protest behavior, whereas personal grievances (Income satisfac-
tion and Trust in parliament) have no effect. These findings indicate that resources
are important for explaining various protest behaviors. For intuitive interpretations
of these coefficients, I calculate the marginal effects and present them in Figure 3.1.
As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, increasing one unit of Education, which ranges
from 1 to 17, increases the likelihood of engaging in soft protest behaviors by 0.018
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Table 3.2: The multinomial estimates of Protest behavior.
Model 1 Model 2
Soft Hard Soft Hard
Income satisfaction 0.091** -0.091 -0.022 -0.034
(0.034) (0.063) (0.037) (0.066)
Trust in parliament 0.028 0.020 -0.044 -0.041
(0.033) (0.065) (0.035) (0.064)
Education 0.000 0.036 0.088** 0.086**
(0.011) (0.021) (0.013) (0.024)
Group memberships 0.464** 0.446** 0.432** 0.469**
(0.023) (0.038) (0.025) (0.041)
Social status 0.134** 0.098** 0.076** 0.066**
(0.015) (0.031) (0.016) (0.030)
Intercept -2.533** -3.570** -1.961** -4.847**
(0.139) (0.274) (0.163) (0.332)
Number of groups 7
Number of observations 10151
Source: Asian Barometer Survey.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.05,
**0.01. No response is the baseline model.
Figure 3.1: Marginal effects from Model 2 in Table 3.2.
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and the likelihood of engaging in hard protest behaviors by 0.004. One unit of change
in Group membership, which ranges from 0 to 3, increases the likelihood of engaging
in soft protest behaviors by 0.07 and hard protest behaviors by 0.017. In addition,
the effect of Social status, which is measured from 1 to 10, is identical to that of
Education. Evidence from Table 3.2 and from Figure 3.1 shows that individual-level
regressors have identical effects on soft and hard protest behaviors, and the only dif-
ference between them is the magnitude of the effects (e.g., the effect of Education on
soft and hard protest behaviors is 0.018 and 0.004, respectively). This phenomenon
indicates that it is not empirically necessary to distinguish between soft and hard
types of protest behaviors. Nevertheless, I will demonstrate how Presidential dummy
can effectively distinguish these two types.
Table 3.3: The multinomial estimates of Protest behavior with country-level regres-
sors.
Soft Hard
Coeff. s.e. dy/dx Coeff. s.e. dy/dx
Presidential dummy -0.023 (0.103) -0.028 1.198** (0.228) 0.071
PR system 0.014 (0.087) 0.006 0.007 (0.154) 0.001
GDP per capita -0.014** (0.002) -0.002 -0.026** (0.004) -0.001
Polity score -0.201** (0.013) -0.035 -0.146** (0.023) -0.004
Freedom score -0.380** (0.024) -0.065 -0.363** (0.042) -0.013
Number of groups 7
Number of observations 10151
Source: Asian Barometer Survey.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.05, **0.01. Each
country-level regressor is estimated separately with only one country-level variable in-
cluded in each estimation. The baseline model is Model 2 in Table 3.2. Coefficients of
individual-level variables are not reported and are identical to those of Model 2 in Table
3.2. No response is the baseline comparison.
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Table 3.3 shows the estimates of country-level variables. Each country-level re-
gressor is estimated separately, and only one country-level variable is included in
each estimation. The baseline model is Model 2 in Table 3.2. The coefficients of
individual-level variables are not reported and are identical to Model 2 in Table 3.2.
Similar to the findings in Table 3.2, GDP per capita, Polity score, and Freedom score
reveal a consistent pattern (negative and significant) to explain soft and hard protest
behaviors. For example, increasing one unit of Polity score decreases the likelihood
of experiencing soft protest behaviors by -0.002 and hard protest behaviors by -0.001.
These findings suggest that grievances resulting from macroeconomic conditions and
the quality of democracy (quality of political institutions) are important for reducing
protest behaviors. Although most country-level variables are not able to identify the
differences between soft and hard protest behaviors, Presidential dummy provides
an important insight: this variable is positively significant in explaining hard protest
behaviors but has no effect on soft protest behaviors. The margin of Presidential
dummy indicates that the likelihood of experiencing hard protest behaviors in presi-
dential democracies is 7% more than in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems.
Thus, the evidence supports H31
3.5 Presidentialism, Democratic Attitude, and Political Violence?
This chapter elaborates and extends the argument and findings from chapter
two. In particular, it aims to resolve the puzzle of why presidentialism has a posi-
tive impact on violent attitude but a negative impact on violent behavior (protest
behavior). To address this puzzle, I argue that protest behaviors must be classified
into two types: soft protest behaviors and hard protest behaviors. Soft protest be-
haviors are those that are legally and culturally allowed in a given society and are
not subject to any observable consequences, such as petitioning and participating in
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a lawful demonstration. Hard protest behaviors are legally and culturally prohibited
in a given society and are often subject to severe legal consequences. I argue that
presidentialism is linked to hard protest behaviors but not to soft protest behaviors
because the rigidity to change of the incumbent president allows the grievances to
accumulate and results in more people who are willing to take risks and bear the
consequences of engaging in hard protest behaviors. I employ the third wave of the
Asian Barometer Survey to examine this mechanism, and the results support the
theory.
Evidence from chapters two and three suggests that presidentialism has a positive
impact on violent attitude and hard violence/protest behaviors. This evidence also
indicates that individuals and groups who are citizens of presidential democracies
are more likely to believe that using violence is justifiable and are more likely to
select extreme strategies with higher risks and consequences when seeking redress for
political and social grievances compared with those in non-presidential democracies.
The findings in the previous section also suggest that common individual indicators
(grievances, resources, and political ideology) show identical patterns in explaining
hard and soft protest behaviors.
In studies of democratic consolidation, scholars have repeatedly emphasized the
importance of the psychological evaluation of democracy and the way this value
can enhance the consolidation of new democracies (see Brantton and Mattes 2001;
Catterberg 2004; Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Huntington 1993, 1996; Mc-
Cluskey et al. 2004; Mishler and Rose 2001; Putnam 1993; Sarsfield and Echegaray
2006; Weatherford 1992). Political violence, particularly by individuals who engage
in activities that might damage the stability of society, is not welcome in any new
democracy and makes democratic consolidation more difficult. Therefore, a follow-up
question must be addressed: how do violent behaviors, both soft and hard, shape the
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public’s evaluation of democracy? In particular, does the experience of hard protest
behaviors weaken democratic attitudes and thus slow and damage democratic con-
solidation?
To address this question, I include variables that measure democratic attitudes
to examine how individual experiences of soft and hard protest behaviors affect
perceptions of democracy. A series of studies has separated democratic attitudes into
four indicators: satisfaction with democracy, preference for democracy, democratic
efficacy, and detachment toward authoritarianism (see Chang, Chu, and Huang 2011;
Chang, Chu, and Pak 2007; Chu, Chang, and Hu 2003; Park, Chu, and Chang
2010). Satisfaction is a four-point scale variable measuring whether respondents
are satisfied with their democratic system.18 Preference is a dichotomous variable
that is coded 1 if respondents consider democracy always preferable to any other
system and 0 otherwise.19 Efficacy is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if respondents
believe that their democracy is capable of solving social problems.20 DA (detachment
toward authoritarianism) is generated by a factor analysis of four relevant items,
indicating respondents’ rejection of authoritarian values.21 Higher values indicate
greater rejection of authoritarian values.
Table 3.4 represents the estimates of the effects of protest behaviors on demo-
18Satisfaction: ‘On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works
in?’ The responses are: (1) ‘Not at all satisfied’ to (4) ‘Very satisfied.’
19Preference: ‘Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?’ The
responses are: (1) ‘Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government,’ (0) ‘Under
some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one,’ and (0)
‘For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime.’
20Efficacy : ‘Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view?’ The responses
are: (1) ‘Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society’ and (0) ‘Democracy can’t
solve our society’s problems.’
21DA: ‘There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the fol-
lowing alternatives? For each statement, would you say you strongly approve, approve, disapprove,
or strongly disapprove? 1) We should get rid of parliament and election, 2) Only one political party
should be allowed to stand for election and hold office, 3) The army (military) should come in to
govern the country, and 4) We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make
decisions on behalf of the people.’
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Table 3.4: Protest behavior and democratic attitude.
Satisfaction Preference Efficacy DA
Soft protest behavior 0.072 0.004 0.166** 0.088**
(0.053) (0.060) (0.062) (0.023)
Hard protest behavior -0.076 -0.186 0.115 -0.137**
(0.107) (0.105) (0.109) (0.040)
Income satisfaction 0.146** 0.089** 0.051 0.011
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.013)
Trust in parliament 0.671** 0.037 0.241** -0.050**
(0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.013)
Education -0.050** 0.035** -0.012 0.036**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004)
Group memberships -0.020 0.066 0.095* 0.015
(0.026) (0.036) (0.035) (0.014)
Social status 0.039** 0.026 0.061** -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005)
Presidential dummy -2.533** 0.280* -0.154** -0.636**
(0.139) (0.116) (0.055) (0.035)
Intercept – -0.254 -0.254 0.127*
– (0.158) (0.158) (0.059)
Intercept (1/2) -0.830** – – –
(0.144) – – –
Intercept (2/3) 1.471** – – –
(0.142) – – –
Intercept (3/4) 4.596** – – –
(0.154) – – –
Number of groups 7
Number of observations 10151
Source: Asian Barometer Survey.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.05, **0.01.
Satisfaction is estimated by an ordered logistic regression, Preference and Effi-
cacy are estimated by logistic regressions, and DA is estimated by an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression. Intercept (1/2), Intercept (2/3), and Intercept
(3/4) are intercepts between each response (e.g., between (1) and (2)) generated
by the ordered logistic model.
cratic attitude. Satisfaction is estimated by an ordered logistic regression, Preference
and Efficacy are estimated by logistic regressions, and DA is estimated by an ordi-
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nary least squares (OLS) regression. Respondents’ weights are incorporated into the
construct of the standard errors, and MICE is performed. Dalton, Sickle, and Wel-
don’s (2010) model is used as the baseline model, and I add Presidential dummy to
determine whether presidentialism has an additive effect on democratic attitude.22
In general, Soft protest behavior is positively and significantly associated with Effi-
cacy and DA, whereas Hard protest behavior is positively and significantly associated
with DA. That is, respondents who have engaged in soft protest behaviors (e.g., pe-
titioning and gathering together for a particular cause) believe that their democracy
is efficacious in resolving social problems and that particularly authoritarian values
(e.g., abolishing parliament and elections and welcoming military rule) should be
abandoned. This finding is expected because soft protest behaviors are considered
a benign method that is regulated under democratic institutions for individuals and
groups to address their grievances. Most importantly, respondents who have en-
gaged in hard protest behaviors, such as violence against the government, are likely
to embrace authoritarian values. In addition, presidentialism is negatively signifi-
cant for explaining Satisfaction, Efficacy, and DA, which suggests that individuals’
evaluations of democracy are lower in presidential democracies compared with par-
liamentary and semi-presidential systems.23
It is evident that hard protest behaviors–those that may severely damage the
stability of any given society and that are legally and culturally prohibited by the
state–are negatively associated with democratic attitudes, particularly detachment
22I do not estimate an interaction model due to the limited variation of Presidential dummy.
23Presidential dummy is positively significant in accessing Preference, which may have resulted
because two options, i.e., ‘Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be prefer-
able to a democratic government’ and ‘For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a
democratic or a nondemocratic regime,’ are collapsed into one category (not preferred). When Pref-
erence is recoded into a three-response categorical variable (‘Preferred,’ ‘No difference,’ and ‘Not
preferred’), Presidential dummy becomes insignificant. However, the test of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IAA) between ‘No difference’ and ‘Not preferred’ is rejected, which indicates
that ‘No difference’ and ‘Not preferred’ are not independent.
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toward authoritarianism. Once the public embraces these anti-democratic values,
democratic consolidation is damaged, and authoritarian alternatives are considered
acceptable. A consolidated democracy refers to a situation in which the democratic
system becomes ‘the only game in town’ (Linz, 1990b, p.156). This situation requires
people to use legal procedures and democratic institutions, such as voting and soft
protest behaviors, to address their political concerns. Thus, hard protest behaviors
are harmful to democratic consolidation because they reduce individual evaluations
of the democratic system and may induce a higher likelihood of democratic break-
down. Thus far, I have demonstrated that presidentialism is linked to higher violent
attitudes and hard protest behaviors and that hard protest behaviors are associated
with lower attitudes toward democracy. Using political violence (democratic crisis)
as a mediator, the next chapter will investigate the relationship between presiden-
tialism and democratic breakdown.
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4. PRESIDENTIALISM, DEMOCRATIC CRISIS, AND DEMOCRATIC
BREAKDOWN
4.1 Introduction
Is presidentialism harmful to democratic consolidation? One of the most preva-
lent arguments regarding the relationship between institutional systems and demo-
cratic survival is Juan Linz’s comment on the curse of presidentialism (Linz 1990a).
Linz argues that presidentialism is harmful to democratic consolidation because of
its generic institutional features. However, despite decades of investigation regard-
ing this relationship with various data and statistical analyses, some studies have
found no evidence supporting the curse of presidentialism (e.g., Alema´n and Yang
2011; Cheibub 2007; Gasiorwoski and Power 1998; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997;
Power and Gasiorwoski 1997; Reenock, Bernard, and Sobek 2007), whereas others
have observed an empirical link between presidentialism and democratic breakdown
(e.g., Boix 2003; Maeda 2010; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 1996,
2000; Sing 2010; Stephen and Skach 1993; Svolik 2008). The contradictory evidence
in published research indicates great interest but uncertainty about the question of
whether institutional arrangements have any systematic effect on democratic sur-
vival.
In this chapter, I argue that there is an important omitted factor in the assessment
of the determinants of democratic breakdown within the current literature. The
existing literature treats democratic survival as either the longevity of democracy, as
measured by how many years a democracy has survived, or a dichotomous treatment
of breakdown and survival in each regime year. But both treatments of democratic
breakdown are incomplete because they do not consider a precondition for democratic
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breakdown, namely, a democratic crisis. I argue that democratic breakdown is best
analyzed as a two-step process. For a democracy to break down, the presence of a
democratic crisis that presents a significant likelihood of overthrowing the current
democratic regime is necessary, but not sufficient. By jointly analyzing the conditions
that contribute to the emergence of a crisis and those that contribute to a breakdown
(given the presence of a crisis), a better understanding of democratic survival will be
achieved.
Specifically, I argue that presidentialism contributes to political instability through
its institutions, which are associated with a greater likelihood of the emergence of
a democratic crisis, but this political instability does not further contribute to the
transition, if any, from a democratic crisis to a democratic breakdown. Using data
covering all democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008 with the regime year as the unit
of analysis and a Heckman probit selection model as the main statistical technique,
I demonstrate that presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than
either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs,
presidentialism does not lead to a higher likelihood of breakdown. Thus, presiden-
tialism is associated with a higher likelihood of democratic breakdown, but only by
affecting half of the process. This limited effect may be part of the reasons why
many empirical studies find no statistical association between presidentialism and
democratic breakdown.
To analyze the robustness of my results, I consider a possible self-selection (or re-
verse causality) problem, whereby crisis-prone countries may choose presidentialism
during democratization rather than presidentialism leading to crises, and alterna-
tive specifications. The robustness analyses support the finding that presidentialism
significantly affects the emergence of democratic crises but is not associated with
democratic breakdown given a crisis. Therefore, the findings suggest that Linz was
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correct that presidentialism generates unstable democracies, but this process does
not occur in the way he theorized; that is, presidentialism indirectly or only partially
contributes to the likelihood of democratic breakdown.
4.2 Institutional Determinants of Democratic Breakdown
There are two general subtypes within representative democracies: presidential
and parliamentary systems.1 The basic structures of power-sharing are essentially
different. In presidentialism, the president holds the most political power in govern-
ment and does not necessarily need to share her power with other political actors.
In parliamentary systems, the cabinet has to share power in accordance with the
composition of the parliament in order to operate and to sustain majority support,
especially when no majority party exists in the legislature. The two systems also
differ in their procedures for removing the current government/executive. In presi-
dential systems, in most instances, the president serves a fixed term, determined by
the constitution, even if her policy decisions are unpopular within the legislature.2
In parliamentary systems, a legislative majority can remove the government by ei-
ther passing a vote of no confidence or rejecting a vote of confidence initiated by the
government.
Political scientists have spent decades studying the institutional differences be-
tween presidential and parliamentary systems. Scholars have analyzed these systems’
inherent generic characteristics as well as their policy outputs. One of the most im-
portant topics is the debate about which institutional arrangement helps a democratic
regime survive without breaking down, particularly in new democracies. That is, the
1Semi-presidential systems are variants of these two types. Some systems more closely resemble
presidentialism when the president can remove the government or when her party controls a legisla-
tive majority. Others are similar to parliamentarism when the president has no power to remove
the government or her party does not control a legislative majority (see Duverger 1980; Elgie 2011).
2It is possible, in some constitutions, to impeach the president. However, the requirements for
an impeachment are usually difficult to achieve; thus, few presidents have ever been impeached.
53
literature seeks to understand how new democracies should choose their institutions
so as to minimize the chances of authoritarian reversals.
Scholars use two research approaches to try to answer this question (Elgie 2005).
Linz’s (1990a) seminal piece, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” explores the generic
differences between presidential and parliamentary systems and treats institutional
arrangements as the only explanatory variable. Linz argues that presidentialism
is harmful to democratic consolidation due to: 1) the “winner take all” nature of
presidential systems; 2) the potential for divided government; 3) interbranch conflict
resulting from the separation of powers; 4) the competing legitimacies produced by
separate presidential and legislative elections; 5) the fixed term of the presidential
office, which may transform governmental crises into systemic crises; and 6) direct
elections, which give presidents an inflated sense of their mandate despite the con-
dition that they lack legislative control, resulting in ineffective governments.3
The second category of institutional studies argues that the fundamental insti-
tutional features of presidentialism and parliamentarism should be analyzed in con-
junction with other institutional variables. Prominent variables include the powers
of the executive, the party system, and the electoral system. The most well-known
explanation is that “the combination of presidentialism and a fractionalized mul-
tiparty system seems especially inimical to democracy” (Mainwaring 1990, p.168).
Mainwaring (1990, 1993) argues that a presidential democracy with multipartism
increases the likelihood of both executive/legislative deadlock and ideological polar-
ization, which generates difficulty in forming inter-party coalitions. The argument
3Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, pp.450-451) summarize Linz’s argument and identify five gen-
eral problems of presidentialism: “1) the executive and legislature advance competing claims to
legitimacy; 2) the fixed terms of office make presidential regimes more rigid than parliamentary
systems; 3) presidentialism encourages winner-take- all outcomes; 4) the style of presidential poli-
tics encourages presidents to be intolerant of political opposition; and, 5) presidentialism encourages
populist candidates.”
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and its supportive evidence lead to Mainwaring’s well-known contribution that “the
combination of presidentialism and multipartism makes stable democracy difficult
to sustain” (Mainwaring 1993, p.199).4 From an alternative perspective, Lijphart
(1995) argues that the combination of parliamentarism and a proportional electoral
system is the best condition for democratic consolidation. In addition, studies show
that the survivability of presidential and parliamentary democracies is conditioned
on economic performance, in which multiparty presidential democracy is especially
prone to breakdowns during an economic contraction (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and
Reenock 2001). As Cheibub and Limongi (2002, pp.175-176) observe,
Parliamentary systems do not operate under a “majoritarian imperative”;
deadlock is not as frequent as supposed under presidentialism and is not
absent from parliamentarism; coalition governments are not foreign to presi-
dential systems and emerge for the same reasons as they do in parliamentary
systems; decision making is not always centralized under parliamentarism and
is not always decentralized under presidentialism.
Despite two decades of institutional studies on democratic survival, many scholars
do not find compelling evidence supporting the curse of presidentialism (e.g., Alema´n
and Yang 2011; Cheibub 2007; Gasiorwoski and Power 1998; Mainwaring and Shugart
1997; Power and Gasiorwoski 1997; Reenock, Bernard, and Sobek 2007). Thus, some
scholars have shifted their attention from the generic institutional features of presi-
dential and parliamentary systems or other institutional factors of the second group
of studies, to other non-institutional factors and new methodological approaches to
examine the question of the shorter life of presidential democracies. For example,
given the observable fact that military regimes are frequently followed by presidential
4Contrary to Mainwaring’s view, Cheibub (2007) observes that legislative fragmentation in mul-
tiparty systems makes coalition governments more likely, and the effect is stronger in presidential
than parliamentary democracies.
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democracies, Cheibub (2007) concludes that the relatively higher breakdown rate of
presidentialism is due to the military legacy preceding the democratic regimes rather
than the factors suggested by Linz. Additionally, Sing (2010) demonstrates that a
less effective legislature and unfavorable U.S. foreign policy are two additional fac-
tors in explaining presidential breakdowns.5 Maeda (2010) distinguishes between
two modes of democratic breakdown based on whether the breakdown is caused by
a force outside of the government or by the suspension of the democratic process
by a democratically elected leader. Maeda finds that the likelihood of democratic
process termination by incumbent leaders is higher in presidential systems. Svolik
(2008) employs a different methodological approach that distinguishes countries that
survive because they are consolidated from democracies that survive but are not con-
solidated. He finds that presidentialism contributes slightly to the likelihood of being
consolidated rather than to the likelihood of breakdown.
In sum, the question of whether presidentialism is harmful to democratic con-
solidation remains unanswered. The differences in the empirical findings can be at-
tributed to several different factors, including sample selection, the statistical model
used, possible omitted variable bias, or the lack of a thorough treatment of the pro-
cess of democratic breakdown. Nevertheless, only Maeda (2010) and Svolik (2008)
attempt to provide explanations for why presidentialism has a mixed effect on demo-
cratic survival.
4.3 Presidentialism, Democratic Crisis, and Democratic Breakdown
Although the debate has received significant scholarly attention, little clear and
concrete evidence regarding the theorized negative effect of presidentialism on demo-
cratic survival has been found. The existing literature has failed to resolve the debate
5For greater detail, see Beliaev (2006), Clark and Wittrock (2005), Frye (2002), Mainwaring and
Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n (2009), and Shugart and Mainwaring (1997).
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initiated by Linz about the likelihood of democratic survival in different institutional
systems. However, despite the mixed empirical evidence, most of Linz’s theory on
presidentialism has not been directly challenged. For example, Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n (2005)
finds that interbranch conflicts are intense in Latin American presidential democra-
cies and encourages the emergence of congressional supremacy as an efficient reso-
lution to these conflicts. More directly, fixed terms of presidential elections in con-
junction with the practical difficulties of presidential impeachment have generated
a hazardous environment for democratic consolidation (Maeda 2010; Marsteintredet
and Berntzen 2008).6 Thus, Linz’s theoretical arguments about the negative effects
of presidentialism may still be valid.
If these specific “presidential features” create problems for presidential regimes,
then why would scholars find mixed evidence? Democracy does not collapse suddenly
and without warning; there are “preconditions” of democratic breakdown. Consider
the example of the implementation of martial law and the subsequent two decades
of the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines between 1965
and 1986. In his second term as president, Marcos was confronted with multiple dif-
ficulties, including economic turmoil, opposition parties that blocked the necessary
legislation needed to implement his policies, a massive leftist protest in Mendiola in
1970 (the First Quarter Storm), the Plaza Miranda bombing that occurred during a
political campaign rally of the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in 1971, and the con-
tinuation of the Moro National Liberation Front’s fighting for an independent Muslim
nation in Mindanao. These conditions impeded Marcos’s ability to achieve his policy
goals, and thus, encouraged him to halt Philippine democracy. Additionally, consider
the recent Thai democratic breakdown in 2006. The corruption and electoral fraud
6In addition, some researchers argue that the effects of presidential interruptions caused by fixed
terms of presidential elections are only minor (see Hochstetler and Samuels, 2011).
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by the chief executive, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, caused mass demon-
strations and protests on the street, ultimately resulting in a coup d’e´tat.7 These
two cases illustrate the fact that there are “preconditions” of democratic breakdown,
which I call democratic crisis.
A democratic crisis is defined as any event that yields a significant likelihood of
overthrowing the current democratic regime. A democratic crisis is a precondition
for democratic breakdown, but not all crises lead to authoritarian reversals. For
example, in 1996-1997, strikes occurred in South Korea, with three million laborers
protesting the new labor law that aimed to constrain labor rights (Koo 2000). If the
incumbent government did not open conversations with the opposition parties and
cease the implementation of the controversial labor law, an undemocratic resolution
might have occurred that would have altered the current democratic government.
In the case of South Korea, President Kim Young-sam peacefully resolved the crisis
without escalating the strikes and without the use of any undemocratic means, such
as violent suppression. Additionally, consider the example of the 1989 Philippine
coup attempt. Military intervention by the United States successfully crushed the
coup and maintained Philippine democracy. Without this intervention, the Philip-
pines would likely have suffered democratic breakdown. Therefore, a democratic
crisis is a necessary condition for a democratic breakdown but is not in itself a suffi-
cient condition.
Democratic breakdown is a two-step process. It begins with a group of initiators
who aim to change or replace the current government by undemocratic means. On
the one hand, the crisis can begin as guerrilla resistance carried out by independent
bands of citizens or irregular forces. Alternatively, the crisis can begin in military
form, as coups initiated by existing military forces and personnel. The main feature
7Various protests in Thailand began in 2005 and lasted until 2006.
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of a democratic crisis is the attempt to overthrow the current democratic regime
by undemocratic methods. Democracy is designed to channel various social groups
within a society and to provide equal political rights for its citizens to participate
in politics. With regular elections and party politics, democracy is also designed
to provide “alternatives.” That is, unlike authoritarian regimes, in which govern-
ments are controlled by dictators who do not rely on the consent of the people to
rule and provide few or no political institutions to share their ruling powers with
others, regular elections in democratic regimes ensure that the rulers are essentially
replaceable through the choice of the people. Thus, when some civilian or military
groups try to overthrow the current regime through undemocratic processes, it in-
dicates that: 1) existing democratic institutions are not capable of addressing their
grievances, such as the Free Aceh Movement, which demanded independence for the
Aceh region of Sumatra from Indonesia from 1976 to 2005; 2) military groups have
interests in and opportunities to replace the current democratic government, such as
the 1989 Philippine coup attempt; or 3) due to an unstable political environment,
the executive attempts to suspend democratic rule to restore order, as did Ferdinand
Marcos of the Philippines and Alberto Fujimori of Peru.
A democratic crisis emerges when there is political instability resulting from con-
flicts between the government and other political actors. I argue that presidentialism
generates political instability because of its institutional features. When a potential
or ongoing conflict exists between the government and other political actors, un-
like parliamentary democracies in which the conflict can be resolved by a vote of
no confidence with a cabinet reshuﬄe or a new election, there is no institutional
means for the president to ease tension except for her own resignation. That is,
when public dissatisfaction towards the president is high, or demands from minority
and under-represented groups cannot be fulfilled, fixed terms of presidential office
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along with their “winner take all” nature, result in an almost unchangeable president
who retains all executive power. This situation provides incentives for the public or
minority groups to try undemocratic means to force a change in the government.8
Conflicts generated by the institutional difficulty of changing the government are a
common and frequent problem in presidential democracies, whose theoretical roots
can be found in Linz’s original condemnation of presidential systems (Linz, 1990a).
In the presence of a potential or ongoing conflict, the military has an incentive to
take over political power because the likelihood of a successful coup is higher in an
unstable political environment, and the president may consider suspending demo-
cratic rules to restore order. Therefore, presidentialism generates political instability
and makes itself crisis prone.
However, I argue that presidentialism does not affect the likelihood of an author-
itarian reversal given a crisis because the mechanisms that lead a democratic crisis
to democratic breakdown differ from the mechanisms that lead to the emergence of
a democratic crisis. If the government is challenged by a coup attempt from civilian
or military forces, the success of this attempt will lie in whether the initiators are
powerful enough and whether the coup is well designed and well staged without op-
posing intervention from other political actors.9 Thus, given the presence of a crisis,
institutional variables have no explanatory power for whether a democratic crisis es-
calates to a democratic breakdown. For instance, the Philippines has suffered many
coup attempts since its second democratization in 1986. Because of poor design or
8In studying Latin American presidential systems, scholars note the problematic institutional
crises caused by interbranch conflicts and the separation of power between the executive and leg-
islative branches. Institutional crisis, or presidential crisis, is coded as successful or failed attempts
to impeach or remove presidents or to dissolve or suspend national legislatures (see Helmke 2010;
Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008; Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n 2005, 2007).
9Similar arguments have been popularized in studies of inter-state and intra-state conflict. The
literature argues that third-party intervention is crucial to maintaining credible commitments from
the government to rebels (see Powell 2002; Walter 2009).
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interventions from the United States, none of these attempts succeeded.
In sum, I argue that Linz was correct in suggesting that presidentialism generates
unstable democracies, but the process does not occur in the way he theorized. By
separating democratic breakdown into a two-step process, from incipient democracy
to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown, I argue that the institutional features
of presidentialism only affect the emergence of a democratic crisis, and not whether
a crisis will escalate into a breakdown. Two testable hypotheses can be derived from
this argument:
H41: Presidential systems are more likely to encounter a democratic crisis.
H42: Given a crisis, presidential systems are not more likely to suffer reversals.
4.4 Research Design
4.4.1 Data
In this study, democracy is defined from a procedural perspective with a partic-
ular emphasis on “office” and “contestation” (see Dahl 1971; Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). Specifically, this view of democracy entails three fea-
tures proposed by Przeworski (1991): “1. Ex ante uncertainty: the outcome of the
election is not known before it takes place. 2. Ex post irreversibility: the winner of the
electoral contest actually takes office. 3. Repeatability: elections that meet the first
two criteria occur at regular and known intervals” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
2010, p.69). The data employed to measure democracy are Democracy-Dictatorship
(DD), which identifies a regime as a democracy when all of the following four rules
are achieved: “1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a
body that was itself popularly elected. 2. The legislature must be popularly elected.
3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections. 4. An alternation
in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to
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office must have taken place” (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, p.69). The
scope of the data is from 1946 to 2008, yielding 133 countries with 187 democratic
episodes. The data on Democratic breakdown, measured as the year when a regime
transitions from democracy to dictatorship, are also included in DD.
Using DD to study democratic breakdown offers advantages over alternative data
sets because of its dichotomous measure of democracy. Other popular indicators of
democracy, such as POLITY IV and Freedom House, code continuous measures
of democracy, and thus pose the difficulty of defining the critical value separating
democracy from non-democracy. Moreover, Freedom House includes some substan-
tive aspects of democracy, such as the quality of governance and corruption, which
may not capture the core aspects indicated above. Thus, it makes intuitive sense to
adopt DD to study democratic breakdown.
4.4.2 Dependent Variable: Democratic Crisis-Breakdown
Democratic crisis is defined as any event that yields a likelihood of overthrowing
the current democratic regime. I operationalize democratic crisis as guerrilla war-
fare, revolution, and coups d’E´tat, which produce a threat to the survivability of the
current democratic regime due to their violent nature and potential for mass mo-
bilization. The data employed to measure democratic crisis are the Cross-National
Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) (Banks 2011). A regime experiences a democratic
crisis when there is guerrilla warfare,10 revolution,11 or coup d’E´tat.12 Democratic
10Guerilla warfare is measured as the presence of “any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings
carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the
present regime” (see Banks 2011).
11Revolution is measured as the presence of “any illegal or forced change in the top government
elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is
independence from the central government” (see Banks 2011).
12Coup d’E´tat refers to the presence of “extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top govern-
ment elite and/or its effective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year” (see Banks
2011).
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crisis is a dichotomous measure coded as 1 when a regime suffers at least one of these
incidents in a given year, and 0 when a regime does not experience any of them.13
The key dependent variable is Democratic crisis-breakdown. This is a dichoto-
mous variable coded as 1 if both a democratic crisis and breakdown are present
in a given country-year, and 0 if there is a democratic crisis without breakdown.14
The missing values represent the underlying selection process in which there is no
democratic crisis or democratic breakdown. I also employ Democratic crisis and
Democratic breakdown as two dichotomous variables, each coded as 1 if a demo-
cratic crisis or democratic breakdown, respectively, occurred in a given country-year.
These two dependent variables allow me to observe the effect of presidentialism on
democratic crisis and democratic breakdown unconditioned on democratic crisis as
robustness checks.
4.4.3 Independent Variables
Following the literature on democratic survival, I compiled a set of independent
variables associated with democratic breakdown and democratic crisis. These vari-
ables can be placed in four categories: political institutions, economic development,
historical and cultural factors, and demographic and geographic controls. Regarding
13In CNTS, there is no variable directly measuring attempts at democratic suspensions by ex-
ecutives. Nevertheless, empirically speaking, all democratic suspensions experienced some types of
domestic unrest before the executives decided to halt democratic rule.
14Most democratic crises and breakdowns occurred in the same year. There are only two cases
that experienced democratic breakdown but are not coded as experiencing any democratic crisis
in CNTS: Sri Lanka in 1977 and Bangladesh in 2007. However, in the case of Sri Lanka, Prime
Minister Junius Richard Jayewardene amended the constitution after 1977, changing its system
from a democracy to a dictatorship partially in response to long-standing pressure from groups
demanding independence for the Tamil-populated areas of Sri Lanka, such as the Tamil United
Liberation Front. In the case of Bangladesh, the president of the caretaker government, Iajuddin
Ahmed, announced a state of emergency in response to a series of protests and violence led by the
Awami League after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) stepped down in October 2006. Both
democratic suspensions were preceded by some forms of domestic violence. Thus, I code these two
events as democratic crises in the absence of guerrilla warfare, revolutions, and coups d’E´tat. The
empirical results with or without these two cases are identical.
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political institutions, the key variable of this study is Presidential dummy, which
is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if and only if the head of state is popularly
elected and is not responsible to the legislature. The other democratic systems,
parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism, are coded as 0 (Cheibub, Gandhi, and
Vreeland 2010). Following Sing (2010), Legislative effectiveness may play an impor-
tant role in shaping the likelihood of democratic breakdown. According to Banks
(2010), Legislative effectiveness is measured on a four-point descending scale: ef-
fective legislature,15 partially effective legislature,16 largely ineffective legislature,17
and no legislature.18 Because Mainwaring (1990, 1993) argues that presidentialism
with multipartism harms democratic consolidation, the effective number of polit-
ical/legislative parties (ENPP/ENLP) has been a common variable for assessing
multipartism (see Cheibub, 2007; Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Sing 2010). However,
the existing dataset measuring the ENPP/ENLP does not include some democratic
countries and hence its use would lead to much missing data. Thus, I use Legislative
fractionalization as an alternative. This variable is an approximation of the proba-
bility that two randomly drawn legislators from the lower legislative chamber will be
from different parties (Henisz 2002).19
Economic development has long been considered a key explanation for demo-
cratic survival (Lipset 1959; Neubauer 1967). It has been argued that the level of
economic development is positively associated with the likelihood of democratic sur-
15Effective legislature refers to a legislature with a high level of autonomy and the power of
taxation, disbursement, and overriding executive vetoes (see Banks 2011).
16Partially effective legislature refers to a situation in which the executive’s power is much stronger
than the legislature’s. However, in this situation, the executive does not completely dominate the
legislature (see Banks 2011).
17Largely ineffective legislature refers to a situation in which domestic turmoil makes the imple-
mentation of legislation impossible or the executive interrupts the legislative process (see Banks
2011).
18No legislature refers to the absence of a legislature (see Banks 2011).
19The empirical results when using ENPP/ENLP, and when replacing it with Legislative frac-
tionalization, are largely identical.
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vival (e.g., Boix 2003; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub,
and Limongi 2000; Svolik 2008). I employ two indicators assessing economic de-
velopment. The first variable is Logged real GDP per capita, which captures levels
of economic development in each regime-year (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2009).20
The second variable is Real GDP growth rate, which measures the overall economic
performance in a given regime-year (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2009). Although
Logged real GDP per capita is capable of summarizing the overall level of economic
development for a given country-year, economic disparity or inequality is not cap-
tured by Logged real GDP per capita. I use Life expectancy (see Wilkinson 1992;
Wilson and Daly 1997) at birth,21 indicating the number of years a newborn infant
would be expected to live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth
remained the same throughout her lifetime, and Neonatal mortality rate (see Gort-
maker and Wise 1997; Macinko, Shi, and Starfield 2004; Mayer and Sarin 2005),22
measuring the probability of death from birth to age one month, expressed as deaths
per 1,000, as explanatory variables. These variables assess overall health inequality,
which is closely associated with economic disparity.23
Historical and cultural factors are believed to have strong effects on democratic
consolidation. To capture such factors, I include Military legacy, which is a dichoto-
mous variable coded as 1 if the military previously held power (Cheibub 2007). As
Cheibub (2007) notes, previous military regimes lead to greater chances of military
interruptions and result in more democratic breakdowns. The second variable is
20The variable is logged to avoid strong leverage from outliers.
21Data are obtained from United Nations Statistics Division, Economic Statistics Branch (2009).
22Data are obtained from Rajaratnam et al. (2010).
23I do not employ direct measures of income inequality, such as the Gini index, because they
generate too many missing values (more than 50% of the total observations) and thus result in
questionable empirical validity. Nevertheless, even with the great number of missing observations,
the empirical results are nearly identical between the model with the Gini index and the models
with alternative measures (Life expectancy or Neonatal mortality rate).
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Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which measures the probability that two randomly
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic
group (Alesina et al. 2003). Societies with high ethnolinguistic diversity experience
more conflicts, such as civil wars (see Easterly and Levine 1997; Garcia-Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol 2004; Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). The third vari-
able is Age of democracy, which codes the total number of years a country has been
democratic in a given country-year. Democracy is not usually an institution that can
be established overnight; it takes time for democratic norms to become consolidated
and for people to learn how to practice democratic rules. Thus, a long-lived democ-
racy is more likely to be consolidated and less likely to suffer a democratic crisis and
breakdown (Power and Gasiorwoski 1997). Finally, demographic and geographic con-
trols are included. These variables include Logged population and Logged territorial
size in square kilometers (Banks 2011).24 A Constant is included in all estimations.
Except for variables that are constant across years (Ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
Logged population, and Logged territorial size) or that represent current historical or
institutional conditions (Presidential dummy and Military legacy), all variables are
lagged by one year to avoid the possibility of reverse causality.
4.4.4 Heckman Probit Selection Model
I employ the Heckman probit selection model (HPSM), clustered on each regime,
to fully account for the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable and the two-
step process of entering into a democratic crisis (the selection process) and democratic
breakdown given a crisis.25 The independent variables are the same for both stages.
24The variables are logged to avoid strong leverage from outliers.
25Clustered standard errors are designed to remove heterogeneity across countries. In other
words, clustered standard errors take across-country correlation into account while allowing for
within-country correlation (see William 2000; Wooldridge 2002; Wooldridge 2003).
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As discussed by Heckman, the HPSM starts with
U1i = γ
′xi + u1i (4.1)
and
U2i = β
′xi + u2i, (4.2)
where U1i and U2i represent underlying unobserved (latent) continuous dependent
variables; xi refers to the matrix of independent variables (the same covariates for
entering into a democratic crisis and for transitioning from a crisis to a breakdown);
γ′ and β′ are coefficients capturing the impact of xi on U1i and U2i respectively; and
u1i and u2i refer to (possibly correlated) error terms, which are assumed to come from
a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and correlation ρ (see Heckman 1997;
Sartori 2003). The observable dichotomous variables representing the realizations
of these underlying unobserved continuous variables are Y1i and Y2i, where Y1i is an
indicator for whether a country experiences a democratic crisis and Y2i is an indicator
for whether a country experiences a democratic breakdown. Y1i or Y2i is 1 when U1i
or U2i is greater than or equal to 0, and 0 when U1i or U2i is below 0. This can be
summarized as:
Y1i =
 0 if U1i < 01 if U1i ≥ 0; (4.3)
Y2i =
 0 if U2i < 01 if U2i ≥ 0. (4.4)
There are three possible outcomes in the HPSM. The first outcome is when no
democratic crisis nor democratic breakdown occurs (Y1i = 0). The second outcome
is when a democratic crisis is present without a democratic breakdown (Y1i = 1 and
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Y2i = 0). The third outcome is when a democratic crisis and breakdown are both
present (Y1i = 1 and Y2i = 1). Thus, their bivariate probit probabilities can be
written as
Pr(Y1i = 0) = Φ(−γ′xi); (4.5)
Pr(Y1i = 1, Y2i = 0) = Φ2(γ
′xi,−β′xi,−ρ); (4.6)
Pr(Y1i = 1, Y2i = 1) = Φ2(γ
′xi, β′xi, ρ), (4.7)
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function and Φ2 is the cumulative
bivariate normal distribution function. Combing equations 4.5-4.7, the log likelihood
function of the HPSM is
lnL(γ, β, ρ) =
∑
lnΦ(−γ′xi) +
∑
Φ2(γ
′xi,−β′xi,−ρ) +
∑
Φ2(γ
′xi, β′xi, ρ). (4.8)
Using the HPSM provides significant methodological advances in analyzing demo-
cratic breakdown. Most importantly, by considering democratic breakdown as a two-
step process, from incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic breakdown,
it allows us to examine whether different factors (explanatory variables) affect the
two stages of this process, while also allowing for the possibility that the unobserved
factors that affect one stage also affect the other stage (through the correlation factor
ρ). In general, estimating the two stages separately using separate logit or probit
regressions, without accounting for the selection process and without allowing for
the possibility that the disturbance terms are correlated, will lead to inaccurate
inferences about the determinants of democratic crisis and democratic breakdown.
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4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Presidentialism, Democratic Crisis, and Democratic Breakdown
In general, the estimates from the HPSM show support for H41 and H42, as
Presidential dummy is positively associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis
but has no effect on democratic breakdown conditional on a crisis having occurred.
Table 4.1 shows the HPSM estimates of the general model specification of Democratic
crisis-breakdown with 3,130 observations. The values in the first and third columns
are the coefficient estimates and their associated clustered standard errors of the
selection model (whether a country experienced a democratic crisis in that year) and
the main model of interest (whether a country experienced a democratic breakdown
in that year given a crisis). The values in the second and fourth columns are the
marginal effects of the covariates on democratic crisis and democratic breakdown
given a crisis, respectively. The Wald chi-square test (56.65) indicates the significance
of the overall model performance at the 0.01 level.
Regarding democratic crisis, Presidential dummy, Military legacy, and Logged
population are positively associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis and
are significant at the 0.05 (Presidential dummy) and 0.01 levels (Military legacy and
Logged population), whereas Logged real GDP per capita and Age of democracy are
negatively associated with the emergence of a democratic crisis and are significant at
the 0.01 level. The estimates of democratic breakdown given a crisis show that only
Military legacy is significant in affecting the likelihood of a democratic breakdown
given a crisis. The second and fourth columns in Table 4.1 are marginal effects that
provide the substantive effect of these covariates. First, if Presidential dummy is
1, indicating that the current political institution is presidentialism, the likelihood
of suffering a democratic crisis will increase by 7.3 percent when holding all other
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Table 4.1: The HPSM estimates of democratic crisis and breakdown.
DV: Crisis Breakdown
Estimates dy/dx Estimates dy/dx
Political institutions
Presidential dummy 0.356** 0.073** -0.410 -0.038
(0.154) (0.031) (0.286) (0.024)
Legislative effect. 0.070 0.014 -0.273 -0.026
(0.123) (0.025) (0.181) (0.017)
Legislative fract. -0.063 -0.013 -0.269 -0.025
(0.375) (0.077) (0.518) (0.048)
Economic development
Logged real GDP pc -0.287*** -0.059*** -0.156 -0.015
(0.105) (0.021) (0.181) (0.014)
Real GDP growth rate -0.001 -0.000 -0.027 -0.003
(0.007) (0.001) (0.017) (0.002)
Historical/Cultural factors
Military legacy 0.503*** 0.103*** 1.274*** 0.120***
(0.188) (0.039) (0.318) (0.034)
Ethnolinguistic fract. -0.069 -0.014 0.131 0.012
(0.359) (0.074) (0.498) (0.048)
Age of democracy -0.008** -0.002** -0.006 -0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Demographic/Geographic controls
Logged population 0.227*** 0.047*** -0.209 -0.020*
(0.062) (0.014) (0.131) (0.011)
Logged territorial size -0.006 -0.001 0.097 0.009
(0.054) (0.011) (0.092) (0.008)
Constant -0.445 — 1.475 —
(1.021) — (1.455) —
Wald chi-square 56.65***
Number of observations 3130
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.1,
**0.05, ***0.01. dy/dx are estimated marginal effects holding all other variables
at their means.
variables at their means. The marginal effect of Logged real GDP per capita on
democratic crisis shows that moving from the poorest country (Logged real GDP per
70
capita=5.91) to the richest country (Logged real GDP per capita=11.26) reduces the
likelihood of a democratic crisis by 32 percent while holding all other variables at
their means. The likelihood of a democratic crisis increases by 10.3 percent when
countries have a Military legacy, and longevity (Age of democracy) helps a country
escape the emergence of a democratic crisis; each additional year of experience with
democracy reduces the likelihood of a democratic crisis by 0.2 percent.
In terms of democratic breakdown, the coefficient for Presidential dummy shows
that the relationship between Presidential dummy and democratic breakdown given
a crisis is negative. However, the estimate is not statistically significant. Military
legacy is a strong predictor of democratic breakdown given a crisis, increasing the
probability of democratic breakdown given a crisis by 12 percent.26
Figure 4.1 shows the marginal effects of Presidential dummy and Logged real GDP
per capita, which are the most important explanations of democratic survival in the
literature (Svolik 2008). The figures in the top row show the predicted probability of
democratic crisis and democratic breakdown given a crisis, as a function of Presiden-
tial dummy, and the black dashed lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals.
The figures in the bottom row show the predicted probabilities as a function of Logged
real GDP per capita for both presidential regimes and non-presidential regimes. The
black and gray solid lines show the predicted probability for presidential regimes and
non-presidential regimes, respectively, and the corresponding black and gray dashed
lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals. On the one hand, political institution
(Presidential dummy) has a strong impact on democratic crisis for poor countries.
The effect of political institution is mitigated when the overall economy is in bet-
ter condition. On the other hand, political institution (Presidential dummy) and
economic development (Logged real GDP per capita) only have a small insignificant
26The marginal effect of Logged population is statistically significant.
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Figure 4.1: Marginal effects from Table 4.1.
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impact on democratic breakdown given a crisis.
Table 4.2 shows the HPSM estimates when measures of inequality are included.
Model 1 and model 2 show the results including Life expectancy and Neonatal mortal-
ity rate, respectively. Both models support H41 and H42, and the results for Military
legacy, Age of democracy, and Logged population are consistent with those shown in
Table 4.1, except for a statistically insignificant estimate for Military legacy in the
selection model of model 2 (column three). The overall model performances are sig-
nificant at the 0.01 level for both models, with the Wald chi-square tests scoring 55.99
and 33.56 for model 1 and model 2, respectively. The numbers of observations (2602
and 2488) decrease due to missing values imposed by Life expectancy and Neonatal
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Table 4.2: The HPSM estimates of democratic crisis and breakdown control-
ling for inequality.
Model 1 Model 2
DV: Crisis Breakdown Crisis Breakdown
Political institutions
Presidential dummy 0.333* -0.329 0.394** -0.468
(0.176) (0.271) (0.190) (0.290)
Legislative effect. 0.049 -0.214 0.043 0.008
(0.132) (0.199) (0.144) (0.214)
Legislative fract. -0.007 -0.122 0.139 0.085
(0.400) (0.587) (0.454) (0.596)
Economic development
Logged real GDP pc -0.023 -0.101 -0.162 0.007
(0.172) (0.222) (0.168) (0.211)
Real GDP growth rate -0.006 -0.030* -0.005 -0.035*
(0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.019)
Life expectancy -0.032** -0.011 — —
(0.015) (0.020) — —
Neonatal mortality rate — — 0.012 0.013
— — (0.008) (0.010)
Historical/Cultural factors
Military legacy 0.452** 1.251*** 0.347 1.089***
(0.221) (0.298) (0.274) (0.383)
Ethnolinguistic fract. -0.197 0.020 -0.306 1.085*
(0.388) (0.548) (0.420) (0.647)
Age of democracy -0.009** -0.007 -0.008* -0.009
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012)
Demographic/Geographic controls
Logged population 0.245*** -0.191 0.229*** -0.164
(0.067) (0.132) (0.072) (0.119)
Logged territorial size -0.041 0.089 -0.026 -0.059
(0.061) (0.106) (0.064) (0.122)
Constant -0.237 1.406 -1.612 0.043
(1.153) (1.510) (1.521) (2.018)
Wald chi-square 55.99*** 33.56***
Number of observations 2602 2488
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.1, **0.05,
***0.01.
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mortality rate. However, by comparing Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, some differences
emerge in the estimates of economic development. First, Logged real GDP per capita
is no longer significant in affecting the likelihood of a democratic crisis in model 1
or model 2. Second, Life expectancy has a negative effect on democratic crisis and
is significant at the 0.05 level, whereas Neonatal mortality rate is not statistically
significant. Third, when controlling for Life expectancy or Neonatal mortality rate,
Real GDP growth rate has a statistically significant negative effect on democratic
breakdown given a crisis.
To summarize, the HPSM estimates from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 provide the
following inferences. First, presidentialism is associated with the emergence of a
democratic crisis but not with democratic breakdown given a crisis. Thus, the ev-
idence supports H41 and H42. Second, economic development is a strong predictor
of democratic crisis but not of democratic breakdown given a crisis. Moreover, it is
likely that, rather than overall economic performance, inequality is key to explain-
ing why some democracies suffer regime instability. Third, as argued by Cheibub,
Military legacy is a strong predictor of both democratic crisis and democratic break-
down given a crisis (Cheibub 2007). Fourth, the longevity of democracy has a strong
impact on democratic crisis but not on democratic breakdown given a crisis. Fifth,
when the presence of a democratic crisis is conditioned on, only military legacy is
significant in explaining democratic breakdown.
4.5.2 Robustness Checks
4.5.2.1 Self Selection
Although there is strong evidence from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 that presiden-
tialism is associated with a higher likelihood of the emergence of a democratic crisis,
it is possible that the causal direction is in the other direction. That is, instead of
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presidential systems entailing greater instability because of the institutional rigidity
in changing the government, it could be argued that crisis prone countries select
presidentialism, because presidents have greater executive power and policy flexibil-
ity, which are essential to resolving domestic conflicts.27 Thus, the positive effect of
Presidential dummy on democratic crisis may be due to reverse causality. That is,
it is not that presidentialism generates democratic crises but, rather, that countries
that are prone to crises choose presidentialism (self-select into presidentialism) to
solve these crises.
One of the most effective methods for solving self-selection (endogeneity) prob-
lems or simultaneous causality bias is instrumental variable estimation (Green 2008;
Heckman and Sedlacek 1985). When endogeneity exists in a regression model Y =
Xβ + ε, where X causes Y and Y causes X, the estimate β is biased because it
captures not only the direct effect of X on Y but also the endogenous effect of Y
on X (cov(X, ε) 6= 0). The purpose of instrumental variable analysis is to “purge”
the endogenous estimate X and leave only the effect that is uncorrelated with ε.
Instrumental variable estimation is conducted in a two-stage process:
X = Zγ1 + δγ2 + υ (4.9)
Y = Xˆβ1 + δβ2 + ε, (4.10)
where Y is the dependent variable, X is the matrix of endogenous independent
variables, Xˆ is the predicted values of the endogenous independent variables from
equation (4.9), Z is the matrix of instrumental variables, δ is the matrix of control
variables for Y , γi and βi are coefficient estimates, and υ and ε are the error terms.
27This is hinted at by the negative estimate of Presidential dummy on democratic breakdown
given a crisis, although it is statistically insignificant.
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That is, instead of regressing the original X on Y , the predicted values of X obtained
in the first-stage equation (equation 4.9) are regressed on Y , where the cov(X, ε) has
been removed by Z. In addition, for Z to be an efficient instrumental variable, the
following two conditions need to hold. First, the instrumental variables must be
exogenous (cov(Z, ε) = 0). Second, the instrumental variables must be correlated
with the endogenous variable (cov(Z,X) 6= 0).
Thus, to check whether the statistical significance of Presidential dummy in Ta-
ble 4.1 and Table 4.2 is not due to simultaneous causality bias from self-selection,
I identify two instrumental variables and estimate two-stage instrumental variable
probit models clustered on each regime with the specified instrumental variables en-
tering both independently and jointly.28 The instrumental variables for Presidential
dummy are Latin America and Catholic proportion. The first instrumental variable,
Latin America, is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the country is located in Latin
America and 0 otherwise (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2011). As
Przeworski et al. (1996, p.46) argue, “countries in which monarchy was abolished
(France in 1848 and again in 1875, Germany in 1919) and colonies that rebelled
against monarchical powers (the United States and Latin America in the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries) replaced monarchs with presidents.” Thus,
empirically, most Latin American countries are presidential. The second instrumen-
tal variable, Catholic proportion, is the proportion of the country’s population that
was Catholic in 1980 (Teorell, Samanni, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2011). Empirical
speaking, Catholic proportion is highly correlated with Latin America and thus is
correlated with Presidential dummy. Both Latin America and Catholic proportion
fulfill the second requirement, as they are both strongly correlated with Presidential
28The probit transformation applies to both stages because presidentialism and democratic crisis
are both measured dichotomously.
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dummy. The first requirement of exogeneity will be assessed in the model estimation,
in which the effects of the instruments on the dependent variable (democratic crisis)
occur via the endogenous Presidential dummy.
Table 4.3 shows two-stage instrumental variable probit estimates of democratic
crisis clustered on each regime. The covariates employed in Table 4.1 are included in
both stages but are not reported. There is no substantial difference between these
non-reported estimates and the estimates in Table 4.1. Model 1 and model 2 use Latin
America and Catholic proportion as the instrument independently, and model 3 uses
both variables jointly. The results from model 1 to model 3 indicate that, despite the
possible endogeneity between presidentialism and democratic crisis, presidentialism
has a strong and positive independent impact on the likelihood of a democratic cri-
sis. Estimates for Presidential dummy are significant at the 0.05 level across model
1 to model 3. Examining the results from the first-stage estimation, Latin America
and Catholic proportion are good instruments independently, whereas model 3 in-
dicates that Latin America is a much stronger instrument than Catholic proportion
when they are jointly included in the estimation. Tests of relevance further indicate
that the second requirement of instrumental variables (cov(Z,X) 6= 0) is achieved.
The first requirement of instrumental variables (exogeneity of instruments from the
dependent variable) is assessed by testing overidentifying restrictions (the Sargan
test), which is an F-test assessing whether the selected instrumental variables are
not strictly exogenous to the dependent variable. The test results show that Latin
America and Catholic proportion are strictly exogenous to democratic crisis inde-
pendently and jointly. Once the requirements of instrumental variables are achieved,
then the remaining question is whether it is statistically better to estimate an instru-
mental variable model or a simple probit model in which the latter is statistically
more efficient. Tests of endogeneity indicate that estimates from an instrumental
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Table 4.3: Two-stage instrumental variables probit estimates of
democratic crisis.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
First stage: DV=Presidential dummy
Latin America 4.652*** — 4.387***
(0.528) — (0.623)
Catholic population — 0.026*** 0.007
— (0.005) (0.006)
Pseudo R2 0.645 0.447 0.671
Wald chi-square 113.33*** 72.26*** 110.19***
Second stage: DV=Democratic crisis
Presidential dummy* 0.410** 0.712** 0.404**
(0.189) (0.291) (0.188)
Pseudo R2 0.190 0.193 0.188
Wald chi-square 122.76*** 31.58*** 69.12***
Test of relevance 77.60*** 31.58*** 69.12***
Test of endogeneity 0.16 1.57 0.01
Test of overidentifying 0.73 0.26 0.94
restrictions
Number of observations 3130 3117 3117
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance lev-
els: *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01. Presidential dummy*, used as a regressor in
the second stage, is the predicted probability generated from the first-
stage estimations. I include the same covariates from Table 4.1 in both
stages without reporting their estimates in the table, to save space.
These variables include: Legislative effectiveness, Legislative fractional-
ization, Logged real GDP per capita, Real GDP growth rate, Military
legacy, Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, Age of democracy, Logged pop-
ulation, Logged territorial size, and Constant. There is no substantial
difference between these non-reported estimates and the estimates in
Table 4.1. The test of relevance is a chi-square test examining whether
the instrumental variables are significantly relevant to (correlated with)
the endogenous variable (Presidential dummy). The test of endogeneity
is a chi-square test examining whether the instrumental variable probit
models generate different estimates compared to single probit models
excluding instrumental variables. The test of overidentifying restric-
tions is an F-test assessing whether the selected instrumental variables
are not strictly exogenous to the dependent variable.
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variables model are not substantially different from those of a simple probit model;
thus, a probit model without considering endogeneity is preferred. In sum, the two-
stage instrumental variable probit estimation shows that, even when considering the
possible endogeneity between presidentialism and democratic crisis, presidentialism
remains a significant factor in explaining the emergence of a democratic crisis.
4.5.2.2 Alternative Specifications
It is natural to wonder whether the HPSM generates substantially different esti-
mates from those obtained by running two independent probit models with demo-
cratic crisis and democratic breakdown unconditioned on a democratic crisis, as the
two dependent variables. To answer this question, I estimate two independent pro-
bit models with clustered standard errors and regress the same covariates specified
in Table 4.1 on Democratic crisis and Democratic breakdown unconditioned on a
democratic crisis, respectively. In addition, it is possible that the significance of
Presidential dummy in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 is simply due to: 1) the empirical
results being biased due to the possibility of temporal dependency; or 2) some im-
portant independent variables being ignored, resulting in omitted variable bias. To
address the first potential problem, I employ Carter and Signorino’s suggestion to
include cubic polynomial variables (t, t2, and t3) in modeling time dependence for bi-
nary dependent variables (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Age of democracy is the time
indicator t in the model, and thus, I include Age of democracy, Age of democracy2,
and Age of democracy3. For the second potential problem, I control for the level of
democracy using the same covariates from Table 4.1 and the HPSM with clustered
standard errors as the estimation technique.
Intuitively, countries with higher levels of democracy are more resistant to both
democratic crisis and democratic breakdown because the practice of democratic rules
79
has already been internalized and has become “the only game in town” (Linz 1990b,
p.156). I employ two sets of variables that measure procedural and substantive
views of democracy.29 The first set of variables is Dahl’s (1971) dimensions of pol-
yarchies, namely, contestation and inclusiveness. According to Dahl, contestation
and inclusiveness are the key attributes of polyarchies, the ideal forms of democ-
racy.30 To assess these attributes, I employ Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado’s
(2008) estimates (factor scores) of Contestation and Inclusiveness generated by the
factor analysis of various democratic indicators.31 The second set of variables is the
Freedom House scores (Freedom score), which are average scores of political rights
(e.g., corruption and minority autonomy) and civil rights (e.g., media freedom and
equality of opportunity). Freedom score is a seven-point descending measure of the
level of democracy, with higher scores indicating greater freedom.
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 present estimates from alternative specifications. In Table
4.4, model 1 and model 2 are the probit estimates of Democratic crisis and Demo-
cratic breakdown unconditioned on a democratic crisis, respectively, and model 3 is
the HPSM estimate of Democratic crisis-breakdown when controlling for time depen-
dence. In Table 4.5, model 4 and model 5 are the HPSM estimates of Democratic
crisis-breakdown when controlling for the procedural view of democracy (Contes-
tation and Inclusiveness) and the substantive view of democracy (Freedom score),
respectively. The probit estimates of Democratic crisis and Democratic breakdown
show consistent support for H41 and H42, in that Presidential dummy is positively
associated with democratic crisis but not with democratic breakdown. However,
29The procedural view of democracy classifies regimes by whether they provide sufficient demo-
cratic institutions and procedures for practicing democracy (e.g., elections), whereas the substantive
view of democracy classifies regimes by the outcomes that they produce (e.g., quality of governance).
30Contestation refers to the quality of democratic competition, and inclusiveness refers to the
quality of political participation.
31For detailed information regarding the variables they use in the factor analysis, see Coppedge,
Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008).
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Table 4.4: Empirical results of alternative specifications.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV: Crisis Breakdown Crisis Breakdown
Political institutions
Presidential dummy 0.356** -0.145 0.441*** -0.487
(0.154) (0.160) (0.161) (0.303)
Legislative effect. -0.063 -0.270* 0.870 0.356*
(0.123) (0.159) (0.134) (0.196)
Legislative fract. 0.070 0.100 -0.077 -0.622
(0.375) (0.355) (0.370) (0.584)
Economic development
Logged real GDP pc -0.287*** -0.189 -0.301*** -0.061
(0.105) (0.119) (0.109) (0.192)
Real GDP growth rate -0.001 -0.022* 0.000 -0.029*
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.017)
Historical/Cultural factors
Military legacy 0.503*** 1.259*** 0.540*** 1.406***
(0.188) (0.199) (0.185) (0.349)
Ethnolinguistic fract. -0.069 -0.220 -0.063 0.505
(0.359) (0.380) (0.369) (0.582)
Age of democracy -0.008** -0.010** -0.040* 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.022) (0.079)
Age of democracy2 — — 0.001* 0.003
— — (0.001) (0.004)
Age of democracy3 — — -0.000** -0.000
— — (0.000) (0.000)
Demographic/Geographic controls
Logged population 0.227*** -0.074 0.236*** -0.227*
(0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.135)
Logged territorial size -0.006 0.095 -0.016 0.083
(0.054) (0.060) (0.056) (0.104)
Constant -0.445 -0.270 -0.208 1.060
(1.019) (1.052) (1.037) (1.496)
Pseudo R2 0.191 0.288
Wald chi-square 121.36*** 82.68*** 57.97***
Number of observations 3130
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.1, **0.05,
***0.01.
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Table 4.5: Empirical results of alternative specifications (continued).
Model 4 Model 5
DV: Crisis Breakdown Crisis Breakdown
Level of democracy
Contestation -0.802*** -0.857** — —
(0.172) (0.409) — —
Inclusiveness -0.167 -0.906*** — —
(0.138) (0.234) — —
Freedom score — — -0.418*** -0.131
— — (0.092) (0.118)
Political institutions
Presidential dummy 0.399*** -0.240 0.309* -0.218
(0.138) (0.293) (0.187) (0.202)
Legislative effect. 0.215 0.559 0.295* -0.015
(0.144) (0.404) (0.151) (0.215)
Legislative fract. 0.094 0.125 -0.015 0.232
(0.389) (0.931) (0.433) (0.520)
Economic development
Logged real GDP pc -0.184* 0.138 -0.162 -0.178
(0.104) (0.359) (0.132) (0.146)
Real GDP growth rate 0.000 -0.030 -0.003 -0.035*
(0.007) (0.024) (0.008) (0.014)
Historical/Cultural factors
Military legacy 0.031 -0.383 0.270 0.960***
(0.213) (0.392) (0.262) (0.323)
Ethnolinguistic fract. -0.009 0.544 -0.386 0.769*
(0.368) (0.779) (0.426) (0.465)
Age of democracy -0.005 0.017 -0.005 -0.012
(0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.009)
Demographic/Geographic controls
Logged population 0.267*** -0.205 0.195*** -0.023
(0.666) (0.199) (0.075) (0.094)
Logged territorial size -0.016 -0.093 0.006 -0.042
(0.049) (0.175) (0.068) (0.117)
Constant -1.031 1.168 -0.046 0.234
(1.037) (2.887) (1.264) (1.259)
Wald chi-square 93.84*** 50.35***
Number of observations 2423 2404
Note: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *0.1, **0.05,
***0.01.
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without taking into account the selection process and the possible correlation be-
tween the error terms of the two probit equations, Legislative effectiveness, Real
GDP growth rate, and Age of democracy become significant predictors of Democratic
breakdown. Thus, taking into account the selection process and the possible correla-
tion between the disturbances is crucial for making appropriate inferences about the
effects of many of the control variables, although not the main variable of interest.
Model 3 shows that after taking temporal dependency into account through cubic
polynomial time variables, support for H41 and H42 remains robust, with almost
identical estimates as those in Table 4.1. Model 4 and model 5 also provide support
for H41 and H42. Contestation significantly lowers the likelihood of democratic crisis
and breakdown given a crisis, and Inclusiveness only affects the likelihood of demo-
cratic breakdown (also in a negative direction), whereas Freedom score is negatively
associated only with democratic crisis. In sum, using independent probit regressions
and controlling for temporal dependency and the level of democracy do not affect the
significant impact of presidentialism on democratic crisis, and do not significantly as-
sociate presidentialism with democratic breakdown given a crisis. Thus, the findings
robustly support both H41 and H42.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Is presidentialism harmful for democratic consolidation? Using data covering all
democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008 with the Heckman probit selection model to
assess a two-step process from incipient democracy to democratic crisis to democratic
breakdown, my empirical findings suggest that presidentialism is indeed harmful for
democratic consolidation, but not in a direct way. Instead, presidentialism con-
tributes to democratic breakdown only through its effect on democratic crisis onset,
and does not make democratic crises more prone to democratic breakdown. The
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findings are robust even when I take into account the possible self-selection prob-
lem, in which countries might choose presidentialism because they are crisis prone
for other reasons, and to alternative specifications. Democratic breakdown is not
an overnight transition from democracy to dictatorship. The presence of domestic
conflict is necessary for a democratic regime to revert to authoritarianism. I have
argued and shown that the intervening factor of a democratic crisis is crucial for
understanding the full nature of democratic breakdowns, and in particular the effect
of political institutions such as presidentialism.
When this necessary condition of democratic crisis is incorporated into the sta-
tistical analysis, several novel empirical findings emerge. First, presidentialism is the
only institutional variable that significantly affects democratic crisis onset. Other
institutional variables, such as Legislative effectiveness (Sing 2010) and Legislative
fractionalization, are not associated with democratic crisis onset or democratic break-
down given a crisis. Second, economic development is no longer a strong explanatory
variable for democratic breakdown. Instead, it becomes a strong predictor just of
democratic crisis onset. This indicates that once a crisis occurs, rich countries are
not less prone to authoritarian reversals and are not more capable of resolving the
domestic crisis democratically. Third, history matters. Military legacy (Cheibub
2007) appears to be a strong predictor of both democratic crisis onset and demo-
cratic breakdown given a crisis. Democracies that have experienced military rule have
a greater potential for democratic reversal, at both stages of the process. Fourth,
democratic longevity is an important factor affecting democratic crisis onset but not
democratic breakdown given a crisis. A longer experience with democracy can entail
a more likely resolution of domestic discontent and thus may prevent the emergence
of a democratic crisis.
Although this study improves our understanding of how different factors affect
84
democratic crisis onset and democratic breakdown given a crisis, the theoretical
explanations for how a democratic crisis escalates to democratic breakdown have not
been tested. According to the revised theory, once a democratic crisis is present,
the determinants of whether this crisis will end in a breakdown are the strength
of the rebels and the presence of third-party intervention. Therefore, an empirical
examination of the factors that affect whether a democratic crisis escalates to a
democratic breakdown will be the next step of this research.
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Introduction
In conclusion, this dissertation finds evidence supporting the curse of presiden-
tialism on democratic consolidation. Presidentialism encourages the public to con-
sider and use political violence to address their grievances because of the rigidity of
changing the government (president) when there exist mismatched policy expecta-
tions between the government and the public. When the government is not capable
of resolving public discontents and of recomposing the executive internally through
institutionalized mechanisms such as a vote of no confidence and government reshuf-
fle, these grievances are likely to be accumulated and individuals who hold these
grievances are more likely to consider and engage in political violence, which is fea-
tured with risks and consequences. Using the World Value Survey and the Asian
Barometer Survey, I demonstrate that people who reside in presidential democracies
have a higher tendency to believe that using violence for their political goals are
justifiable and to adopt violent protest strategies to address their grievances.
Following this finding, I intend to provide a tentative conclusion to a debate re-
garding whether presidentialism is associated with democratic breakdown by arguing
that democratic breakdown is best analyzed as a two-step process. For a democracy
to break down, the presence of a democratic crisis (political violence) that presents
a significant likelihood of overthrowing the current democratic regime is necessary,
but not sufficient. By jointly analyzing the conditions that contribute to the emer-
gence of a crisis and those that contribute to a breakdown (given the presence of a
crisis), a better understanding of democratic survival will be achieved. Specifically,
I argue that presidentialism contributes to political instability through its institu-
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tions, which are associated with a greater likelihood of the emergence of a democratic
crisis, but this political instability does not further contribute to the transition, if
any, from a democratic crisis to a democratic breakdown. Using data covering all
democratic regimes from 1946 to 2008, I demonstrate that presidential democracies
are more likely to encounter crises than either parliamentary or semi-presidential
systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism does not lead to a higher
likelihood of breakdown. Thus, presidentialism is associated with a higher likelihood
of democratic breakdown, but only by affecting half of the process. This limited
effect may be part of the reasons why many empirical studies find no statistical
association between presidentialism and democratic breakdown.
5.2 Contributions
This study provides two major contributions to the field of comparative politics
and studies of democratic consolidation. First, it draws attention to the relationship
between democratic institution and political violence. Studies of political violence
have not paid enough attention to the effect of the domestic institutional structure.
Some democracies are more likely to experience high level of political violence while
others are not. This is not thoroughly due to the variation of economic development,
social disparity, and political opportunity structures as suggested by the literature
(see Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Gurr 1970; Lichbach 1995; Schnytzer 199; Tarrow
1994; Tilly 1978). As evident, presidentialism is a factor contributing to the forma-
tion of political violence in existing democracies, and this mechanism requires more
attentions from scholars and policy makers.
The second contribution of this dissertation is to provide a tentative conclusion
toward a decade-long puzzle in the study of democratic consolidation: are presi-
dential democracies more likely to break down? The evidence of this dissertation
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suggests that presidentialism is indeed harmful to democratic consolidation. How-
ever, the relationship between presidentialism and democratic consolidation is not
direct, as those scholars have suggested (Boix 2003; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub,
and Limongi 1996, 2000; Sing 2010; Stephen and Skach 1993). There is an indirect
relationship between presidentialism and democratic breakdown, through the me-
diator of political violence (democratic crisis). That is, presidentialism contributes
to political violence (democratic crisis) directly, and political violence is served as
the precondition of democratic breakdown. Thus, presidentialism affects democratic
breakdown indirectly through political violence. The findings conclude that new
democracies should select other macro institutional designs which may result in the
lower possibility of authoritarian reversals and prolonging its democratic system.
In sum, this dissertation broadens the study of democratic consolidation by bridg-
ing theories of political institution (presidentialism) and political behavior (political
violence). Existing research has not constructed a synthetic theory which is capable
of explaining the curse of presidentialism on democratic consolidation and providing
consistent evidence. This dissertation offers a successful combination between these
theories with evidence suggesting a consistent interpretation: presidentialism is as-
sociated with political violence (democratic crisis) which is a necessary condition
of democratic breakdown, and thus, presidentialism affects democratic breakdown
through its effect on political violence (democratic crisis).
5.3 Limitations and Extensions
Though the findings of this dissertation provide important contributions to stud-
ies of democratic consolidation, there is one major limitation in this study: measure-
ment. The issue of measurement is a consistent problem across chapter two, three,
and four. In chapter two, violent attitude is operationalized as respondents’ responses
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to a four-point scale (1-4) agree-or-disagree question–‘using violence to pursue polit-
ical goals is never justified.’ This is a direct question regarding whether respondents
believe violent behaviors are justifiable for their political goals. However, given the
fact that most cultures do not encourage political violence as a mean to achieve their
goals, respondents are likely to conceal their true attitudes, and thus, analyses on
violent attitudes may be underestimated. A better alternative for anchoring violent
attitude is to design a set of survey questions that indirectly measures respondents’
approval or support of political violence. These questions would involve a set of
well-designed wordings that are capable of extracting the underlying unobservable
traits of political violence. Questions such as “Do you support the statement that
the end justifies the means?” or “Do you support the statement that harmony of the
society is the most important goal for each individual” are possible candidates for a
better measurement of violent attitude.
In chapter three, protest behaviors are separated into two types: soft and hard.
Soft protest behaviors are measured as respondents’ experiences of ‘Got together
with others to try to resolve local problems,’ or ‘Got together with others to raise
an issue or sign a petition,’ while hard protest behaviors are past participation of
‘Attended a demonstration or protest march,’ or ‘Used force or violence for a political
cause.’ The concern of the validity of the measurement lies in the first item of hard
protest behaviors: ‘Attended a demonstration or protest march.’ It is assumed that
any demonstration or protest march is considered illegal and violent in the selected
Asian democracies. This assumption may hold its validity under the content of
East and Southeast Asia since traditionalism, or so called Asian values prevail in
these countries, and thus, participating in any demonstration or protest is likely
to be considered as illegal or culturally unwelcomed. However, there exists some
possibility that some demonstrations are legally approved by the government and
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no violence has occurred during the movement. Therefore, a better alternative is to
separate ‘Attended a demonstration or protest march’ into two items as ‘Attended
a legal demonstration or protest march,’ and ‘Attended an illegal demonstration or
protest march.’
The measurement is also an issue in chapter four. The measurement of demo-
cratic crisis, which is defined as any event that yields a likelihood of overthrowing
the current democratic regime, and is operationalized as guerrilla warfare, revolution,
and coups d’E´tat, is not the perfect realization of democratic crisis. It is arguable
that other events, such as mass protests, demonstrations, or domestic terrorist activ-
ities, may also threaten the stability of democratic regimes. Nonetheless, within the
existing cross-national-time-series data (panel data), my measurement of democratic
crisis is a treatment that maximizes the number of observations and to capture the
critical conjuncture of democratic breakdown. In addition, since it is impossible to
identify whether mass protests and demonstrations coded in the existing data are
soft or hard protest behaviors, only those events that threaten the regime stability
greatly are taken into account. A cross-national events dataset with a clear coding
scheme regarding the severity of political violence (soft or hard violent behaviors)
will be able to clarify this measurement issue.
This dissertation leads to three research venues worthy the exploration. First, I
plan to investigate the relationship between violent attitude and violent behavior.
It is assumed in this dissertation that violent attitude transfers unobstructedly to
violent behavior. That is, individuals who believe using violence for political goals is
justifiable will be more likely to engage in violent behaviors. Nevertheless, thinking
of using violence and practically using violence involve different risk calculations.
Violent behavior needs to take a much more profound and deeper consideration
regarding the likelihood of success and the severity of backslash from the state,
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whereas violent attitude requires no such consideration given the fact that there is
no risk of thinking before action. Thus, the mechanisms explaining violent behavior
and violent attitude may vary. To further address this issue, I intend to conduct
an experiment to investigate: 1) the measurement that are capable of extracting
the underlying unobservable trait of political violence; and 2) the triggers or the
intensions (conditions) directing violent attitude to violent behaviors.
In this dissertation, I argue that it is essential to separate soft and hard protest
behaviors theoretically and empirically. However, except for the key explanatory fac-
tor in this dissertation, presidentialism, I have not demonstrated any other factors
that are capable of offering different explanations to soft and hard protest behav-
iors, respectively. Thus, the second project I envision to do is to identify different
mechanisms explaining soft and hard protest behaviors. I believe that the key to
explain soft and hard protest behaviors lies in the section 3.5, where I investigated
the relationship between democratic attitude and political violence. A revised theory
with sufficient empirical analyses would be able to discover these mechanisms. This
project will also contribute to the understanding of democratic consolidation.
One of the most important contributions of my dissertation is to theorize demo-
cratic breakdown as a two-step process, from democratic crisis to democratic break-
down. Democratic crisis is defined as any event that yields a significant likelihood
of overthrowing the current democratic regime. I employ the Cross-National Time-
Series Data Archive (CNTS) by Arthur S. Banks with regime-year as the unit of
analysis in my dissertation. However, by doing so, I can only assess how macro in-
dependent variables, such as economic indicators and existing political institutions,
affect the likelihood of suffering democratic crises. The micro-mechanism of demo-
cratic crises thus has not been systematically analyzed. The last project I envision
involves collecting a cross-national events dataset covering all democratic countries
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from 1946 to present. I will document and profile in detail each democratic crisis,
including the identity of initiators, the background situation of the event, and the
interactions between the government and the rebels. With this information in hand,
I can systematically examine the micro mechanism of my dissertation regarding how
political institutions (e.g. presidentialism) incentify civilian or military forces to take
actions aiming to overthrow the current democratic government. Furthermore, this
information provides a good opportunity to understand why some crises led to a
non-reversible breakdown while other did not.
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